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23 JUNE 1986

Southeast Asia Report

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AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES PREMIER WRAN TO RESIGN

BK070855 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 7 Jun 86

[Text] The premier of New South Wales, Mr Neville Wran, has announced that he will resign as premier from 4 July. The premier made this surprise announcement at a state Labor Party conference in Sydney. He was sworn in as premier of New South Wales in 1976 and has become the state's longest serving premier.

Mr Wran told about 1,000 delegates at Sydney's Town Hall that his decision to resign was a most difficult one. He said he did not believe he should ask the party or the people to go hostage for his fortune, his continued health, and stamina for a further 4-year term.

Mr Wran said that having made the decision to resign, it was best done as soon as possible. He said he did not have definite plans for what he would do after resigning, but it would probably have something to do with the law.

The prime minister, Mr Hawke, said Mr Wran's decision to resign marked the end of a decade of outstanding service by Mr Wran to the Labor Party, to New South Wales, and also Australia.

Mr Hawke also referred to what he called persistent and unprincipled attacks upon Mr Wran's character by his political opponents. He said Mr Wran had emerged with his reputation and integrity untarnished and held a place in the first rank of Australian politics.

/7358
CSO: 4200/1117

AUSTRALIA

BRIEFS

HAYDEN'S EUROPE, ASIA VISITS--The minister for foreign affairs, Mr Hayden, has left Australia on a five-country overseas tour. He will first visit Thailand, then Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, and finally the Philippines, where he will attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Post Ministerial Conference. Mr Hayden said before his departure from Melbourne airport that the issues he would discuss with Thai leaders included the situation in Kampuchea and also developments in the ASEAN region at a time of commodity trade collapse. The minister said that in particular he would be discussing a concern shared by Australia and Thailand arising from the American export enhancement program which subsidizes the export of farm products, in this case, rice, to the disadvantage of countries like Australia and Thailand.
[Text] [Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 7 Jun 86 BK] /7358

COMMONWEALTH SANCTIONS AGAINST RSA--The prime minister, Mr Hawke, says he will urge other Commonwealth leaders to impose sanctions against South Africa. Mr Hawke's comment follows the failure of representations to the Pretoria government by the Commonwealth eminent persons group. The prime minister said in Sydney that the group had admitted to Commonwealth leaders that further talks with South Africa on the apartheid system would lead nowhere in the current circumstances. Mr Hawke said that South Africa had shown it was unwilling to change its internal or external behavior but had flung out the eminent persons group initiative for purely tactical reasons. He said that as a result he would be urging a meeting of representatives from Commonwealth countries in London in August to take strong steps against South Africa.
[Text] [Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 9 Jun 86 BK] /7358

CSO: 4200/1117

BURMA

OFF-SHORE OIL SEARCH HALTED; ON-SHORE OIL SEARCH STARTED

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 27 May 86 p 19

[Article by Min Thu]

[Text]

BURMA appears to have suspended its offshore oil exploration programme in favour of onshore exploration activities.

Observers reached this conclusion following the government's termination last Mar. 31 of the services of the on-rig consultants **Forex Neptune**, a drilling company of the Schlumberger group.

Oil industry experts describe Burma's apparent intention to concentrate on the onshore oil exploration programme as "tough but smart". They said the development of the country's onshore potential was definitely more promising and a lot cheaper.

With a capital investment of about US\$200 million, the country's present production of about 12 million barrels annually could be doubled in one year, they said. They added that offshore operations were costing Burma about US\$20,000 a day.

Two reasons for the government's decision to revise its policies may be the gloomy international oil market picture and the lack of foreign exchange, oil industry sources said.

Prime Minister Maung Maung Kha may have also picked up a few tips from the Chinese during a recent visit to China to study that country's socialist modernisation and oil industry.

He was accompanied during the visit by former cooperatives Minister Sein Tdin who now heads the newly created Ministry of Energy.

Burma was probably also driven to reconsider its options by the high investments needed to further its offshore oil exploration programme.

An exploration activity in the Gulf of Martaban, the Martaban project, was said to need already a capital outlay of about US\$1 billion.

The country has invested about US\$308.69 million in the mining sector (including the oil industry) during its fourth four-year plan which ended Mar. 31. This amount included foreign aid and loans amounting to US\$143.8 million.

Onshore oil exploration and development activities were being undertaken with the help of loans from Japan, West Germany and Austria, among others.

With a modest external debt of about US\$1.8 billion, Burma has been regularly repaying the principal and interests when they are due without any rescheduling.

However, debt servicing has been eating up more than a quarter of all the country's export earnings.

In 1981-82, when Burma's foreign loans totalled US\$308.18 million, debt service charges amounted to US\$126.34 million or 39.17 per cent of its export earnings. The following year's foreign loans of US\$388.04 million resulted in debt service charges of US\$120.45 million or 31.32 per cent of export earnings.

For 1983-84, the charges totalled US\$184.68 million or 34.56 per cent of Burma's export earnings and they rose to US\$174.99 million or 33.59 per cent of the export earnings in 1984-85.

Burma expects that for the current fiscal year, which began Apr. 1, the country would have foreign loans totalling US\$327.225 million, grants of US\$76.0575 million and a short-term loan of US\$7.8 million.

Debt service charges this year will be about US\$367.4 million or 49.96 per cent of the expected total export earnings of US\$735.21 million.

Burma's offshore oil exploration activities started in April 1974. The country adopted a service contract system under which the contractor brings in equipment and capital, the costs of which will be recovered from sales at an agreed percentage. Profits would also be shared later on agreed terms.

American, Japanese, French, Italian and West German oil companies signed up for exploration rights in the Gulf of Martaban and off the Arakan coast on the Bay of Bengal.

The foreign firms withdrew eventually. Burma announced resumption of offshore oil exploration activities on Nov. 7, 1983 with the help of a US\$16.8 million loan from a Japanese consortium known as the Burma Petroleum Development Co.

This was followed by an official announcement that a "huge natural gas reservoir" of "economically significant proportions" was struck.

Burma sought to tap natural gas resources in the Gulf of Martaban. It solicited international financing and technical expertise.

Two years ago, the government bought **Forex Neptune**'s jack-up rig **Trident I** for US\$12.5 million and renamed it **Naymyint** for the Martaban project.

Forex was employed as on-rig consultants. The termination of its services is taken to signify also the shelving of the Martaban project. — Depthnews Asia

/9274

CSO: 4200/1110

MALAYSIA

MAHATHIR MOVES SEEN AS AIDING ELECTION PROSPECTS

BK080359 Hong Kong AFP in English 0314 GMT 8 Jun 86

[Article by Mervin Nambiar]

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, June 8 (AFP)--Malaysia's prime minister has brightened his ruling coalition's electoral prospects and virtually guaranteed it a two-thirds majority by admitting to it Sabah's ruling the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), analysts said Sunday.

Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's not unexpected announcement last week that he was expanding his national front coalition is also an important step in setting the stage for elections to the 177-seat federal parliament and the legislative assemblies of at least 11 of Malaysia's 13 states, they said.

Although the federal government's current term does not expire until June 14 next year, Dr Mahathir is widely thought to be weighing the prospects of an early general election, which some opposition politicians said could take place before the next budget in October.

The NEW STRAITS TIMES newspaper, which often reflects official thinking, said the PBS's entry into the coalition meant that the national front "is now set to wade into the nation's poll with more confidence than ever."

The Christian chief minister of the east Malaysian state of Sabah, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, sought membership for the coalition of largely ethnic parties shortly after the PBS's shock victory over the Parti Berjaya--a member of the ruling coalition--in state elections in April 1985.

Although PBS admittance was backed by several members of the then 11-member coalition, the party was denied entry largely because of allegations from within Dr Mahathir's United Malays National Organisation (Umno) that Mr Kitingan only represented Sabah's Christian Kadazans and ethnic Chinese.

Mr Kitingan, [word indistinct] disproved the allegations and charges by the Moslem-based opposition united Sabah National Organisation (USNO) that he was discriminating against Moslems in a subsequent state election in May this year, when the PBS was returned to power with a more than two-thirds majority.

Dr Mahathir admitted both the PBS and the USNO to his coalition--a move that sources in the national front said would ensure that most if not all 20 seats up for grabs in Sabah in the next general election would go to the front.

All Dr Mahathir's predecessors have held two-thirds majorities in parliament, and failure to be returned with a similar majority because of expected losses in peninsular Malaysia could well trigger moves to oust him, a diplomat here said.

Both UMNO and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)--the coalition's major Chinese component--are expected to suffer losses in the next election, analysts said.

The diplomat commented that admittance of the PBS appeared to be "a marriage of convenience."

Le Lam Thye, deputy secretary general of the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), said that the PBS was admitted not out of choice but out of fear that the government would end up with a less than two-thirds majority.

Fan Yew Teng, secretary general of the small Socialist Democratic Party, called Dr Mahathir's move an insult to Sabahans because he said it perpetuated the myth that no party could rule a state without membership of the coalition.

Membership of the national front gives Mr Kitingan a chance to build bridges to the Malay-dominated federal leadership, which is still wary of his government's claim to represent all racial groups in Sabah and which is anxious to appear the protector of Moslem rights, analysts said.

The PBS's entry should also go a long way to ensure that resource-rich Sabah receives an equitable share of government revenues channelled into development at a time when the state is badly hit by the slump in timber and other commodity prices, analysts said.

"He will now be better placed to deliver on electoral promises, particularly to reduce politicking, and get down to the business of reviving Sabah's economy already affected by political uncertainty," a western diplomat here said.

Under a unique system the USNO and Berjaya, both national front members, will sit in opposition at the state level although as chairman of the front in Sabah Mr Kitingan will have to temper his rule with a degree of consultation with the opposition parties.

Political observers said that although the chief minister had ruled out any form of power-sharing with the USNO and Berjaya, consultations under the front's broad concept of government should reduce political and ethnic tensions that boiled over in March resulting in the violent death of five people.

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CSO: 4200/1114

MALAYSIA

BRIEFS

NEW SARAWAK POLITICAL PARTY--Kuching, Tuesday--A new political party, Pertubuhan Bumiputera Bersatu Sarawak [PBBS--United Sarawak National Association], has been established. Former Parti Pesaka Bersatu [PBB] vice president Haji Wan Habib Syed Mahmud was elected chairman of the Protom Committee. Haji Wan Habib, who is also the state assemblyman for Balingian constituency, left PBB on 15 May. His position as PBB vice president was suspended since November last year. The official application letter to register the party has not yet been received by the Department for Registration of Societies since last Saturday. [Excerpt] [Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 21 May 86 p 3 BK] /7358

CSO: 4200/1114

PHILIPPINES

NEWS HERALD VIEWS AQUINO-LAUREL RELATIONS

HK061449 Manila THE NEWS HERALD in English 6 Jun 86 pp 1, 6

[By Vincente M. Tamedo]

[Text] One distinct peculiarity of the new government is the silent but "fierce" competition between the president and the vice president.

The first hundred days of the revolutionary setup have seen it as a contest where there are no threats or exchange of harsh words. Only the thoughts of individuals concerned perhaps are violent.

Laurel has privately felt aggrieved since the new administration started groping its way in March.

Although his predecessors in office had been allotted some working space in Malacanang, Laurel instead was hurriedly assigned to the Office of Prime Minister in the Old Congress Building, only to be told that such office has been abolished with the Batasan. Laurel had to console himself as a caretaker, a post almost equivalent to that of a building superintendent.

In the appointment of officers-in-charge for local governments by Local Governments Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Laurel's UNIDO [United Nationalist Democratic Organization] followers were mostly overlooked. When Laurel suggested the merger of UNIDO and PDP-Laban [Pilipino Democratic Party-Lakas ng Bayan], the faction of President Aquino and Pimentel, the latter balked.

It is said that only a stroke of the pen by Ms Aquino would end the factional impasse and make unity a reality but obviously, Ms Aquino has not yet found the right pen.

Some administration watchers believe that the reluctance of the president to see the materialization of one party in power is the fear that the merger would still make UNIDO, being the bigger faction, dominate party affairs. In such a situation, the president of the country will be under Laurel, the president of UNIDO.

If there have been misgivings on the part of several members of the Aquino cabinet about the draft of the executive order specifying the powers and functions of the vice president, these could have been fancied or real.

But the man, as a leader and politician, is extraordinarily clever. Even then since the effectivity of the proposed executive order is of temporary duration (that is, until the ratification by the plebiscite of the draft of the new Constitution) the fears are groundless.

In denying Laurel his short tenure of administrative authority, Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo was said to have argued that the decision of the Constitutional Commission on the type of government would have rendered the executive order eventually ineffective. But until then, they could have allowed Laurel to enjoy a brief spell of bureaucratic happiness.

Aware of the secret efforts of ill-wishers in the cabinet to relegate the vice presidency to the inutile post of ceremonial officer whose principal chores include welcoming and entertaining visiting foreign dignitaries, cutting ribbons, retelling the feats of the bloodless revolution to the point of boredom and kissing babies when the president is not in the mood to do so, Laurel is determined to project himself into the limelight. And it does not require an executive order to do this.

More available for speaking engagements than the president, Laurel has spoken in almost every forum. His well researched and carefully worded speeches on foreign and economic issues during the last hundred days make them sound authoritative. [Word indistinct] office staff estimate that as of Tuesday when Laurel enplaned for a three-day sojourn in Tokyo, the vice president had delivered about 80 speeches. This does not include the briefings he gives newsmen regularly and the welcoming remarks that foreign bigwigs, on a brief stint here, love to hear.

Laurel's accessibility to people is supposed to make up for the president's default, who through no fault of hers, has to suffer from the inexplicable need to isolate the presidency.

As the highest official of the new government to go on a foreign mission, Laurel had more than the usual polite talks with U.S. President Reagan and other ASEAN leaders in Bali recently. More contacts with foreign heads of government are expected as the man moves audaciously to make the vice presidency more than an honorary office.

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CSO: 4200/1116

PHILIPPINES

COLUMNIST CRITICIZES CON-COM'S 'ELITIST' COMPOSITION

HK070822 Quezon City ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 29 May 86 p 4

[Column by Luis R. Mauricio: "The Con-Com's Elitist Complexion"]

[Text] The 44-man Constitutional Commission package which President Aquino unwrapped before the nation early this week is, on the whole, a pretty collection of bright Filipinos, all successful in their respective lines of endeavor.

Two striking features present themselves to the objective observer poring over its contents. These are: (1) it dispelled all reasons for concern expressed by U.S. officialdom over its composition; and (2) it is completely dominated by clerico-fascists and agents of vested interests.

American officials' disquiet was communicated to the Cory government through a WASHINGTON POST article which appeared Saturday (on the eve of the deadline the president had set for the announcement of 50 persons she was appointing to draft a new constitution).

The article stated that official Washington was worried that the commission would include three communists. Mrs Aquino apparently can [word indistinct] U.S. pressure when she spots one; she saw to it that U.S. worries over the matter become unfounded.

Washington also expressed anxiety, the article continued, over the possibility that the political party of deposed President Marcos would not be represented in the Con-Com. Well, Washington need not fret; Mrs Aquino has set aside five slots for the opposition.

By bowing to American pressure for her to give seats to Marcos minions, the president in effect ate her words--words found in the law creating the Con-Com and reiterated in her talk at the "Reunion of Edsa [Epifano de los Santo Avenue] Heroes" last Sunday: that those who will be named to the Con-Com must pass "the acid test of integrity, probity, independence, nationalism and patriotism." Anyway you look at it, how can Marcos' lackeys--whether proudly sporting the KBL label or hiding behind the colors of the PNP (Partido Nacionalista ng Pilipinas), NPA (Nacionalista Party of the Marcos Administration), or group of Independents--possibly hurdle the test of integrity and independence?

Of the names initially announced by Mrs Aquino, 16 represent religious interests. The number of constitutes 36.3 percent of the package. [sentence as received] Three of them are Catholic priests, one a Catholic nun, nine Catholic lay leaders, including an opus Dei activist; there are two executive ministers and one prominent layman from the Protestant sect.

In her talk before the EDSA "heroes," Mrs Aquino said she was reserving the 45th slot for a representative of the Iglesia ni Kristo [INK]. However, latest reports state that an INK spokesman said that the sect's hierarchy has declined the distinction.

(In an obvious swipe at their fellow ecclesiastics, the INK excellencies reportedly said they have not yet reached the decision that membership in the Con-Com was part of their job of rendering spiritual guidance to their flock.)

Be that as it may, since Mrs Aquino had indicated willingness to give one seat to the INK, it would not be entirely surprising if the animists of Bontoc, the born-again Christians, the Ananda Marga sect, the Espiritistas, and Jehovah's Witnesses, not to mention the Philippine Independent (Aglipayan) Church, among others, demanded their respective slots in the commission.

Twelve of the names so far announced are known to be prominent in finance, trade and industry. Four of these are rabid promoters of transnational activity in the Philippines. In contrast, labor and the peasantry have one representative each.

The member from labor, a union leader of a bygone era, cannot be expected to represent the youth and the liberal factions of that sectoral group. While the member from the peasantry is known to be progressive, he is likewise reported to have close links with the clerical group.

The Muslim representation consists of three. The cultural minorities from the Cordilleras, Zambales, Mindoro, Palawan, Panay and northern Mindanao have been completely ignored; they are not represented at all.

Although Mrs Aquino thinks there would be five Marcos men (for whom she had set aside the remaining seats) in the commission, in truth there would be eight of them. The other three--one of whom is more closely associated with Imelda's brother Kokoy than with the deposed dictator--have managed to get themselves appointed among the initial 24.

Eight old "polis" grace the list of 44. They are expected to bring into the commission the stifling breath of traditional politics which made possible the rise of a Marcos dictatorship.

There are but two who can be classified as coming from the youth sector. While there are five appointees who can be identified as SocDems and NatDems, only two members can really be considered as having credentials from the Left.

The elitist complexion of the commission is beyond question. There is not one among the members who can say with a straight face that he works entirely with his hands.

How the government could field such a team, composed of upper middle class gentry, and expect it to draw up a credible constitution that will express the ideals and aspirations of the more numerous masses is difficult to understand; unless, perhaps there is a grain of truth to the reports going the rounds of the coffee shops: that the draft of the constitution had long been completed by the grey eminence lurking, Richeleu-like, behind the curtains in the presidential office.

If that be so, it is just as well that its genteel composition remain [word indistinct]. The honorable men and women who have received Cory's benediction can serve--as intended--as mere adornments.

At any rate, the clergy, among all the [word indistinct] comprising the Con-Com, would wield the heaviest clout, what with a force of 17 representatives (out of the total number of 50), granting that the seat reserved for the INK would still be given to one from the religious community.

The danger arising therefrom is obvious. The clerics, who are basically conservative in outlook in the socio-politico-economic arena, will endeavor to dominate the constitution-drafting process.

If that happens--and the few sober-minded members will not be needed--the product of a rightist Con-Com's labors will contain provisions that will erase the line separating the church from the state, which is the most valuable legacy passed on to us by our forefathers who fought the 1896 revolution.

We might be presented with a fundamental law that is anemic, a stranger to bold trusts and liberal ideas because these would be too radical for the Con-Com manipulators, or a document that would be useless to our youth in their search for guidelines as they move forward to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

It is an unfortunate scenario that could have been avoided, if only Mrs Aquino, abjuring her new-found distrust of the wisdom of the electorate (whose determined vote catapulted her to power), opted for an elected constitutional convention rather than an appointed one.

/9274
CSO: 4200/1116

PHILIPPINES

MISUARI AIDE IN CEBU AIRS WARNING

Manila THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 24 May 86 pp 1, 7

[Article by Leo Enriquez]

[Text]

CEBU CITY — A top aide of Moro National Liberation Front chief Nur Misuari warned President Aquino Friday that she has a few days left to prevent a fullscale war from erupting in Mindanao.

At the same time, the aide said that "military action can never suppress what six million Filipino Muslims believe in as their rights."

Misuari's aide, who continued to request anonymity, issued the ulti-

matum during another exclusive interview which he granted in the outskirts of this city.

During the interview, the aide said he would rejoin the main MNLF forces in the southern back door, where he said they are now massing, in preparation for a full-scale offensive next month.

"WE HAVE stated our position

right from the very start that peace can only be achieved in Southern Philippines if President Aquino negotiates directly with MNLF chief Nur Misuari and implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement," he said.

Recent developments, he said, have shown that the new government does not seem to favor the settlement of the Mindanao problem.

"The attitude of the new government and the presence of unreliable persons betrays the lack of sincerity on the part of President Aquino, which could prolong the agony in Mindanao," Misuari's aide said.

"As far as we are concerned, we will continue to assert what is rightfully ours and we will not go down on our knees to beg for peace," he said.

"Only the next few days can tell what is going to happen in Mindanao, and we have prepared for any eventuality," the Misuari aide said.

"IF BLOOD is going to be shed, it is not through our own fault. President Aquino should be held responsible for every life that is lost in the ensuing conflict," he said.

Misuari's aide said Mindanao symbolizes Muslim resistance to Spanish colonialism and the people there shall continue to resist any intrusion into their home and invasion from Christian converts.

/9274
CSO: 4200/1109

PHILIPPINES

MNLF BASE, ACTIVITIES IN SABAH REPORTED

Meetings, Medical Aid in Sandakan

Kuala Belait BORNEO BULLETIN in English 17 May 86 pp 1, 3

[Article by Han Ling]

[Text]

MORO guerilla fighters have set up base on a hideaway island off Sandakan, north-east Sabah.

They are members of the outlawed Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) many of whom have been trained in Libya where their leader, Nur Misuari, still lives.

They fit secretly in speedboats across the Sulu Sea between their hideout and their battlegrounds in the southern Philippines.

The Muslim MNLF is fighting for autonomy in its homelands, in provinces of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan.

Movements of MNLF leaders between Sandakan and Mindanao have increased lately giving rise to speculation of a new offensive against Philippine Government troops.

Some 30 MNLF and civilian leaders of Mindanao are said to have met for five days in Sandakan last month to discuss ways of dealing with the new Government of President Corazon Aquino.

And military authorities in Manila claim to have uncovered plans by the MNLF to launch a revolution dubbed "Big Fight '86" in Mindanao in August this year.

They say a heavy concentration of fighters has been noted in

Jojo, capital of Sulu province.

But in Sandakan, MNLF leaders remained tight-lipped about their plans.

I was told that further orders and instructions were awaited.

These were normally fed through a network of couriers operating between Tripoli, Mindanao and Sandakan.

Key MNLF figures operate under code-names.

Only last week, a top MNLF official arrived in Sandakan for a meeting on the movement's island which is hidden from view by mangroves.

Here, the men have built wooden houses and some say they have stockpiled weapons.

The island, a few kilometres from Sandakan, is an open secret among the townspeople.

The MNLF has become part of the fabric of the town, blending in with thousands of Filipino refugees and illegal immigrants.

The island is used mainly as a refuge from Philippine Government forces.

"After a mission, the men return there — it's all well organised," said one man who had visited the camp.

The guerrillas even bring their wounded into the Duchess of Kent Government hospital in Sandakan for treatment.

"They come in with bullet and bomb injuries and we patch them up. Nobody is turned away but it puts a terrible strain on the hospital's resources," a health service source said.

The island is heavily guarded and a Sabah politician who got too close to the camp, is said to have been warned off by armed guards.

It is not known how many men are on the island.

The Aquino Government in its efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the Moro problem sent a representative to Sandakan in early March to initiate talks with leaders of the Filipino refugees.

He was Colonel Hernani Figueras, of the General Staff Corps of the Philippine Constabulary. He also visited Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.

His efforts to get the refugees to agree to return home, met with little success, MNLF sources said.

However, the visit was thought to have paved the way for future negotiations.

Mr Hajji Abdul Rahman Ismail, who described himself as an information officer for the MNLF, was very cautious when asked if the MNLF was planning a major offensive.

"They (the Government military) have seen our troops on the move so they think we are planning something big," he told the Bulletin.

"We are moving troops continuously. We don't announce our plans in advance, so I

can't comment on them."

Mr Abdul Rahman is a former police captain from Cotabato and like other MNLF officials, is known to his colleagues by a codename.

He said Col. Figueroa won support from a few refugee leaders linked to a group led by Macapantun Abbas, which is said to be more amenable to Government peace moves.

The group also claims to be the real leaders and champions of the Moro people — a

claim which has fuelled factional rivalry and tension among Moros in the Philippines and Sandakan.

A senior MNLF official said a bloodbath involving young fighters of the two groups was narrowly averted in Sandakan recently.

"We have got many hot-headed young fighters and they wanted to sort out the Abbas men, but we managed to stop them," a MNLF official said.

The MNLF wants to

prevent its differences spilling into violence on Malaysian soil, at all costs.

Moros are everywhere around the town. It is impossible to tell the guerilla fighters from the many refugees and illegal immigrants lounging around the pavements and coffee shops.

"You never know if the young guy kicking his heels in the street will be cutting loose with a gun somewhere in the southern Philippines the next day," said one resident.

Many Moros, like a security man in a local nightclub, talk proudly of being trained in guerilla warfare in Libya.

Some treasure photographs they have had taken with Colonel Gadaffi.

Moros say they are unlike other Filipinos and want to preserve their strongly Islamic traditions, customs and way of life.

They talk of one day achieving self-rule in their homelands — or dying in the attempt.

Officials Silent on Hideaway

Kuala Belait BORNEO BULLETIN in English 17 May 86 p 1

[Text]

POLICE in Sandakan would not discuss the island but Sabah Police Commissioner, SAC Haj Ahmed Mausina bin Haj S.M. Babjee, said he would be visiting the town soon to check on the situation in the district.

A highly placed official in Kota Kinabalu said: "The island is supposed to be very secret and you need special permission to go there."

"I think the Federal Government must be aware of it, but just ignores it."

And another official source said: "It is incredible — Sandakan is swamped by Filipinos, from the north and south Philippines."

He said former Chief Minister Tun Datu Haj Musapha bin Datu Harun openly supported the Moro rebellion.

Sabah's last Chief Minister Datuk Harris Saleh was accused of trying to strengthen the Muslim vote by registering refugees.

Libya-Trained Commander on Struggle

Kuala Belait BORNEO BULLETIN in English 17 May 86 p 1

[Text]

HUNDREDS of thousands of Filipino Moros took refuge in the cities or in other countries after the Moro rebellion spread in the early 1970s.

Many settled in Sabah and some were later given refugee status and are living in settlements set up by the Sabah Government and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

Nobody knows exactly how many Filipinos have fled to Sabah but figures upwards of 200,000 and 300,000 have been bandied around.

Datu Noor Mohammed Saifullah, 39, once planted rice in his village in southern Philippines.

families and others escaped to Sabah in bumboats. The journey took sometimes two or three days. But not everybody made it.

"Sometimes the boats sank because they were overloaded and other times Philippine navy boats stopped them. We have lost hundreds of our people at sea."

Datu Noor Mohammed joined the MNLF and spent a year training in Libya — "the centre of the Muslim revolutionary movement."

He said his men relied heavily on arms captured from Government forces.

Has he killed many of the enemy?

"Naturally — I don't know how many. But I never killed any civilians."

Among the heroes on the MNLF island hideaway, is Ummun Sabi, a former vice-mayor of the town of Petrol in Sabah, now in his 60s.

He was one of the guerrillas who took part in the 1977 massacre of General Suharto and his whole staff in Petrol.

The guerrillas wiped out six colonels including Suharto and several Non-Commissioned Officers, majors and captains leaving just one survivor. Ten of the guerrillas were killed.

That land has since yielded a harvest of death. Many of his countrymen are buried there.

Now Datu Noor Mohammed is a zone commander with the MNLF in charge of 1000 men.

During a visit to Brunei, he talked to the Sultan about his people's struggle.

"The Government troops have turned on us with tanks, jet fighters, napalm and heavy artillery and we have only small arms and maybe some anti-aircrafts," he said.

"But we will fight on. The Government army murdered so many of our

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CSO: 4200/1109

PHILIPPINES

ENRILE ON SUPPORT, ABILITY FOR MILITARY TAKEOVER

Manila THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 24 May 86 pp 1, 7

[Text]

DEFENSE MINISTER Juan Ponce Enrile said yesterday fears of a military takeover stem from insecurity among President Aquino's advisers.

"There is no reason for us to undermine her or take action against her," said Enrile during an interview about the role he and Gen. Fidel V. Ramos played in bringing Mrs. Aquino to power three months ago.

"If we wanted to, there is no doubt about it, we could."

HE SAID he and Ramos had political support and the crowds that assembled when the two men

rebelled against deposed President Marcos backed them as well as Mrs. Aquino.

"They were there because of a desire to protect and support us," Enrile said.

He said talk of a military takeover stemmed from some government advisers.

• • •

"I DON'T BLAME them for speculating," Enrile said of such government officials. "We don't blame them for entertaining fears or doubts about us. The feeling springs from the awareness of some people of what they consider the

weaknesses of the government. Some people feel insecure about the strength of the government."

He said: "We have had no trouble in our relationship with Mrs. Aquino. We consult her, we get her feelings on decisions to be made. These are the same things we would have done with any other commander-in-chief."

Enrile said if he had wanted power, he and Ramos could have taken over the government when they rebelled against Marcos. He said he believed at the time that he had enough political support throughout the country to carry off such an action.

"The only way to deal with such speculation, is to show to the people that we work together," said Enrile. "No amount of verbalization will solve the problem. By showing the people we are working together to serve the people, this kind of speculation will dissipate."

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CSO: 4200/1109

PHILIPPINES

MARCOS LOYALIST CAMP REPORTEDLY SET UP IN KALINGA-APAYAO

HK070829 Quezon City ANC PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 2 Jun 86 pp 1, 6

[By correspondent Romy Tangbawan]

[Text] Military deserters loyal to former President Marcos are training recruits in the jungles of Kalinga-Apayao Province in an apparent bid against the three-month old Aquino government, reliable sources said.

The "loyalists" camp is in Calanasan town, 150 kms away from Kalinga-Apayao's capital of Tabuk, nearly 450 kms north of Manila.

The camp is a small valley, covered by thick mountain forests in the upper part of Calanasan, near the border with Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte and Claveria, Cagayan, on the rugged northwestern edge of Luzon.

Access to the camp from Tuguegarao, Cagayan is through a concrete highway which winds up north passing through the tip of Luzon, connecting Cagayan with Ilocos Norte.

From the Calanasan-Pagudpud-Claveria border, it can be reached through a rugged road constructed by a Marcos crony-owned logging company.

The small valley, once used by the underground New People's Army (NPA) as its training camp in the early 70's, is aptly codenamed by the military as "Blue Heavens"--on a sunny day, one can see only a blue sky between thick forests.

The sources told MALAYA in an interview that the trainers might have come from different units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including the now defunct elite Presidential Security Command (PSC) once commanded by Col Irwin Ver, son of the former AFP chief of staff.

Earlier, Camp Aguinaldo disclosed that nearly 300 soldiers from the PSC had deserted the military service.

Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen Fidel Ramos said the loyalists had emerged as a potential threat to the security of the country.

The other threats are the Muslim separatists, the New People's Army (NPA) and common criminals, he said.

"We strongly believe they (those in training) are Marcos loyalists since their barracks are posted with huge pictures of Marcos, his wife, and Gen Ver," the sources said.

They reported seeing a former provincial commander of a northern province, who openly supported Marcos, in the camp.

The officer, with a lieutenant colonel's rank, is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), they said.

Trainees are said to number about 400 men.

A recruit is paid an initial amount of P20,000 and an undisclosed monthly salary even during the training period.

"Blue Heavens" is an ideal training ground for rebels, the sources said, adding the area has a complete forest cover and is hardly accessible to vehicles.

One can also raise food in the valley's fertile soil.

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CSO: 4200/1116

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL URGES FREEDOM FROM U.S. 'IMPERIALISM'

HK090341 Manila THE NEWS HERALD in English 7 Jun 86 p 4

[Editorial by Milarion M. Henares, Jr: "Why This Nation Can't Industrialize"]

[Text] In the 1950's, the Philippines pursued a vigorous industrialization program that was the envy of all Asia, including Taiwan and South Korea, then fighting a civil war. The Taiwanese and Koreans used to send delegations here to find out how we did it.

Today, Taiwan and South Korea are industrialized, and are exporting ships, cement factories and computers, while the Philippines exults in the export of mail order brides, housemaids, and prostitutes, and as our TV spots indicate, hand-woven hats, baskets, and shellcraft.

We are being forced by the United States and the U.S.-dominated IMF to revert back to the import-export plantation economy that has been our lot since 1910, a colonial pre-industrial economy based on "export-oriented agriculture-based, small scale, labor intensive and rurally dispersed industries," as the World Bank so insists with iron resolve. But why, for Christ's sake?

The military-industrial strategy of the United States in the Pacific require the viability of the economies of its principal allies--Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. These three are industrialized nations with a small agricultural base, a need for food and raw materials as well as a non-industrial market into which to dump the surplus products of their proliferating industries. The whole of Southeast Asia is tailored to that role, and therefore must be kept agricultural and restrained from industrializing.

This U.S.-IMF design was rejected by all ASEAN countries, except the Philippines. Such ASEAN nations as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia are frantically industrializing and posting the highest growth rates in our part of the world, while the Philippines, the only one with a negative growth rate, has adopted an [begin italics] official policy against industrialization and in favor of a pre-industrial agricultural export-oriented economy. [end italics] While the rest of Asia built economies based on steel, computers and machines, we build ours on the basis of yellow corn, garments, buntal hats and ipil-ipil.

Today we buy our toys, hand tools, computers and diesel engines from Taiwan and South Korea, in exchange for iron ore, logs and crude coconut oil. We are a people inexorably being pulverized to serve the military-industrial complex of the United States in Asia.

We are a nation in the process of being converted into a wasteland, like the ghost towns that grew out of the California gold fields--systematically despoiled of its resources for the benefit of industrial nations, deprived of the opportunity to develop its own means of survival, forced to import the most elementary necessities, sinking deeper into debt, and constrained to offer its patrimony for the plunder of others in payment of imports and in exchange for loans.

Our greatest enemy is not the Communist NPA, not the Muslim secessionist MNLF [Moro National Liberation Front] nor the military establishment, nor even deposed President Marcos. Our greatest enemy is our own colonial mentality, our oedipus complex toward Mother America.

The time has come to slay the American father image, to liberate ourselves from American imperialism, to frustrate U.S.-IMF designs to prostrate our economy and keep us dependent on the Paris Club and the U.S. military-industrial complex.

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CSO: 4200/116

PHILIPPINES

RADIO COMMENTS ON MILITARY BASES, U.S. EXPLOITATION

HK061109 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0940 GMT 6 Jun 86

[Commentary by (Abel) Cruz]

[Text] My friends, on the issue of the American military bases here in the country, we all know we are being grossly underpaid as far as the rentals go. Why is this? Because it is the Americans who dictate the terms on how much rental they should pay. This is not as it should be. If you are the owner of an apartment, you inform the tenant what rental he should pay--it is not the tenant who tells you how much he will pay. Isn't that so? But in the case of these bases, the Americans who are using our land are the ones who dictate the terms of what they will pay for setting up their military bases. We Filipinos have been turned into beggars and they insult us in the process. And not only that--the Americans give us things like AIDS, gonorrhoea, syphilis and other diseases. Those are extra bonuses we get for letting them put up their bases here.

All this, my friends, is something we should change. We should understand what is being done to us. The Americans may call us communists, they may say those who are writing our new constitution are communists because the constitution will specify that the military bases should be removed. The Americans will say those drafters of the constitution are wicked people and communists. They will say this because they have a stranglehold over the media and they can mount their own propaganda, but we should not listen to their lies.

In this program we will continue to discuss these issues and inform the people about the provisions of the constitution, especially where it pertains to the military bases because all our people should know what is involved. In this way we will know what to do when the time comes for us to ratify the constitution. We intend to explain all the issues being raised in the constitutional commission.

It is very important that our people be informed about these topics. Those people in Pampanga who work in the bases--do you know what Filipino employees at the bases earn? If I am not mistaken, Filipinos are paid P4 an hour, while Americans who do the same jobs are paid (\$12) an hour. So as you can

see, there is discrimination in our own country, we are being mistreated by foreigners. This is something we should not allow. We should get over our colonial mentality and stop letting the Americans play God with us.

We know very well the Americans use all sorts of ways to win over people. They give out scholarships to our students--from the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and other organizations supported by their government. But all those, my friends, are supported by the CIA. Those grants are vehicles used to distort the thinking of Filipinos so that they will serve the interests of the Americans who want to go on exploiting and oppressing us.

All this is of no benefit to us. The Americans do not treat us as human beings. Those of us who have lived in the U.S. know that ordinary Americans are good people. But their government is another matter altogether. We should oppose their government because it takes advantage of poor countries like ours. We should resist exploitation wherever it occurs in the world. We are a small country but we should not allow ourselves to be used and degraded.

In this program we will continue to discuss the topic of imperialism and how it affects our people. We will be accused of being communists, for using a word like imperialism, but it is important for Filipinos to understand all these things. Filipinos should know why we are slaves in our own country.

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CSO: 4211/56

PHILIPPINES

PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF INCOMES SURVEY RELEASED

HK090652 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 6 Jun 86 p 2

[Text] The National Census and Statistics Office announced today the preliminary results of the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) showing an apparent increase in average annual income of Filipino families. Final results will be ready by early 1987.

The FIES conducted in two survey rounds--July 1985 and January 1986--show that the annual average income of Filipino families in 1985 was P30,748, almost ten times more than the average annual income of P3,736 in 1971. But in real terms, this average income is only worth P3,471 compared to that of 1971.

In urban areas, the average annual income of P46,209 was twice the rural annual average income P21,409. Average annual expenditures in both areas are likewise less, P38,949 and P19,323 respectively.

Average family income and expenditures are highest in the National Capital Region (Metro Manila), P58,197 and P48,475 respectively. Family income and expenditures are lowest in the Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), only P17,795 respectively.

The main source of income for most families are entrepreneurial activities, 41 percent; salaries and wages, 40 percent. Some 541,000 families claim that they are primarily dependent on cash gifts, receipts and assistance from abroad.

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PHILIPPINES

GOVERNMENT HOLDS ROK SHIP IMPLICATED IN LOG SMUGGLING

HK060721 Hong Kong AFP in English 0709 GMT 6 Jun 86

[Text] Manila, 6 Jun (AFP)--The Philippine Government has taken over ownership of a South Korean ship after the vessel figured in an aborted log smuggling try in the southern Philippines, the newspaper MALAYA reported here Friday.

Customs officials in the southern city of Davao seized the 3,713-tonne cargo ship M. S. Dooyang Diamond after an official probe established that the vessel was involved in smuggling logs last month, the daily said.

The Korea-registered vessel, then owned by Dooyang Lines Co Ltd, was found to have loaded illegally procured logs in the provinces of South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat Provinces [as received] early last month, it added.

The daily did not say where the shipment was destined.

Customs officials here told AGENCIE FRANCE-PRESSE they had not received an official report on the takeover.

The vessel's value was placed at 30 million pesos (1.46 million dollars), MALAYA said.

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PHILIPPINES

MANILA TO BAN LOG EXPORTS BEGINNING 21 AUGUST

HK061508 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 6 Jun 86 p 2, 7

[Excerpts] President Corazon C. Aquino is expected to announce today the imposition of a log export ban that will take effect on 21 August.

Natural Resources Minister Ernesto Macea told a press conference that the ban was formally approved by the Cabinet last Wednesday.

Macea said the Cabinet also approved the total scrapping of export taxes on all agricultural and wood based products.

Philippine Wood Products Association (PWPA) President Ernesto Sanvictores told BUSINESS DAY that the scrapping of the export taxes on wood products alone would mean a loss of revenue of P83 million for the government. Lumber and veneer, which are imposed a 4 percent export tax, generated \$90 million and \$14 million in earnings respectively last year. The plywood export tax, which used to be at 2 percent, was abolished last year.

However, he said 50 percent of the logs which should be exported is expected to be channeled for local processing into export products. "We have gained a 4 percent advantage in the value of wood products," Sanvictores said, adding that the government move would improve the country's competitiveness against its main competitor, Indonesia, which does not impose export taxes.

Sanvictores said with the ban on log exports, the private sector will now concentrate its efforts on improving utilization efficiencies. Local processing costs were placed at 60 percent to 70 percent of the total cost of the finished products.

With the Philippines bowing out of log exports, the market would be left to Sarawak, Sabah, Papua New Guinea, Solomon and Fiji Islands.

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PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

PRIEST'S KIDNAPPERS DEMAND RIFLES--In Mindanao, the kidnappers of French Roman Catholic priest Michel de Cigord have asked for 20 armalite rifles in addition to the 200,000 pesos [as heard] being demanded earlier. Maguindanao military commander Brigadier General Rolando Gutang said the kidnappers have threatened to kill the priest if the rifles were not delivered today. Gigord was the chaplain of the Mindanao State University in Marawi City and was kidnapped 4 days ago. Brig Gen Gutang said two of the kidnappers were relatives of former Lanao Del Sur Governor Ali Dimaporo. Dimaporo denied any connection with the kidnapping. He said the information was deliberately sent to the military to mislead them and to discredit him. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 8 Jun 86 HK] /9274

CIVILIAN LAYOFFS AT SUBIC--In Subic Naval Base, Zambales, some of the estimated 13,000 Filipino and American civilian employees at the naval base complex are facing lay-off due to budget reductions in the entire U.S. Navy. Donald Kline, acting director of the consolidated civilian personnel office at Subic Naval Base, said that lay-offs of employees are still in the planning stage and numbers have yet to be determined by the various commands in units in the base. Earlier, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy ordered a freeze in the hiring of civilians and (?activities) that have exceeded the levels of the fiscal year 1986 budget. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 6 Jun 86 HK] /9274

CSO: 4200/1116

THAILAND

COLUMNIST FAULTS U.S. ON LIBYA VOTE REPLY, ASKS APOLOGY

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 6 May 86 p 7

[Article by Likhit Thirawekin: "The United States, an Inferior Great Power"]

[Excerpts] The reaction by U.S. State Department officials to Thailand's vote in favor of the UN Security Council resolution condemning the U.S. air raid on Libya has generated much talk about Thai-U.S. relations and about the moral position of the United States in world society.

This reaction by the United States has created the feeling that the United States has changed from being a superior great power to being an inferior great power that has lost its way and that is striking out blindly. It is acting illogically. This is worrisome. It reflects a lack of confidence and a loss of moral strength. It had been expected that a great power such as the United States would maintain these qualities.

This reaction to Thailand's action shows the real nature of the United States. This shows that it lacks a sense of justice and does not understand the difficult position of an ally. From the standpoint of principles and what is right, Thailand, which was chosen to serve as a member of the Security Council, must carry out its duties honestly in order to promote what is right and help maintain world peace.

The U.S. attack on Libya resulted in the deaths of innocent people, including children and women. No matter how you look at this, it is impossible to justify this act. It must be condemned.

Terrorism is a crime that should be condemned. But the use of aircraft to attack another country is an act of war. This is a violation of another country's sovereignty. This is a violation of international law and a threat to world peace. Furthermore, an important political aspect is that from now on, if a country does something that displeases the United States, the United States might attack that country using military force. And when the matter reaches the UN Security Council, it will simply use its veto power to put an end to the matter.

This image is bad for the United States, for relations between the United States and other countries, for international political stability, and for the stability of the world.

This reaction by the United States to Thailand's action shows that the United States wants Thailand to ignore the principles, forget what is right, and support it on something that is wrong in the interests of friendship. Their idea is that supporting a friend comes first.

The United States should apologize to Thailand for troubling Thailand, which has been put in an embarrassing position. The United States is looking at things in a very illogical way, and this is very surprising. A great power such as the United States should not take the position that "if you do not support us, you are our enemy."

The United States has consistently said that it will uphold justice, freedom, and democracy. But it has acted contrary to these ideals. The United States has damaged its own prestige. Its actions have shown the inferiority of a country that has implemented an erroneous political policy time and again. And now it is implementing a protectionist economic policy, which is contrary to the principles that it has always espoused.

While the United States cited friendship as an excuse to put pressure on Thailand in the Libyan matter, it forgot about this completely when it implemented the Farm Act. But what we should think about even more is the threatening attitude exhibited by the United States, or State Department officials. They acted like an adult who is upset with a child and threatened to punish us by cutting off our allowance. Thailand, which is an independent country, does not have to put up with this.

International relations must be based on mutual respect and a sense of equality. But the reaction by the United States can only be construed to mean that the "adult was angry with the child." It may be that other countries often take a negative view of the United States because the United States tries to set itself above others or act superior.

The United States should remember that relations between Thailand and the United States benefit both countries. It is not just Thailand that benefits. Demanding payment for past favors, taking a threatening attitude, or acting upset will damage our bilateral relations. Thailand, in particular, is very proud of its independence.

The United States should not be so emotional. Instead of looking at things in a distorted manner, it should examine the reasons and facts in order to bring things into clearer focus. It should do this before events unfold in such a way as to damage Thai-U.S. relations or threaten world peace.

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CSO: 4207/232

THAILAND

EDITORIAL HAILS INDEPENDENCE OF THAI POLICY ON LIBYA VOTE

Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai 5-11 May 86 p 6

[Editorial: "Foreign Policy, an 'Independent' Step of Which We Can Be Proud"]

[Text] ML [royal title--FBIS] Phiraphong Kasemai, Thailand's ambassador to the United Nations, voted in favor of the UN Security Council resolution condemning the United States for attacking Libya. Even though the United States complained that "our friend should not have done that," this decision lit a spark and opened up a new dimension for our foreign policy.

During the long history of Thai-U.S. relations, even though we have proudly said that these relations have been based on a spirit of fraternity and equality, we all know how much fraternity and equality there has been in actual practice.

Several senior Thai have said, correctly, that the United States does not regard Thailand as a "friend" that is its equal. Rather, it regards Thailand as a "satellite country" or "underling." The result of such a relationship is that Thailand has lost its economic independence. Even its sovereignty has been violated on occasion, such as when the United States had military bases here 10 years ago.

It cannot be denied that Thailand's "dependence" type national development strategy has resulted in our having to "depend on" a great power such as the United States. Thus, although we have said that we adhere to a neutral foreign policy, this has not been the case in actual practice. We have always sided with the United States. Our policy has been "biased."

The decision to condemn the United States for its insane attack on Libya must be recorded as independent step of which we can be proud. The response of the people clearly shows how they feel about our past foreign policy.

This is the first time in many years that we have stood on our own feet and acted independently. How would the people feel if we took a truly independent stance? That is easy to answer.

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CSO: 4207/232

THAILAND

NO OFFICIAL OBJECTION TO PRIVATE PEACE EFFORT WITH LAOS

Bangkok NABO WA in Thai 29 Apr 86 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Private Organization To Sail a 'Peace Boat' to Laos To Promote Between Relations Between Thailand and Laos"]

[Text] Dr Khothom Ariya, the vice chairman of the committee in charge of the 1986 Year of Peace Project, talked about the progress made in implementing the "Thai-Lao peace boat" project, in which a boat will be sailed down the Mekong River in order to promote friendship between Thailand and Laos. He said that to date, little progress has been made. Some elements of the project may have to be eliminated based on the recommendation of the National Security Council. This may have to be done in order to avoid certain dangerous points.

The "Thai-Lao peace boat" project was the idea of a private organization that was involved in disseminating information on peace last year. This year it is coordinating things in conjunction with the International Year of Peace of the United Nations. They plan to sail a boat from Mukdahan-Savannakhet down the Mekong River to Vientiane-Nong Khai, stopping at towns on both banks of the river as they go. Along the way, they will stage various activities to celebrate peace.

This project was discussed with the Office of University Affairs, which is responsible for the 1986 International Year of Peace project, government officials, the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Council (NSC). They said that they did not have any objections as long as the private sector handled matters. However, they did recommend that certain points be avoided because of the danger.

"We may have to change the plan somewhat. We may have to start the trip from Bung Kan District or some other point in order to shorten the distance," said Dr Khothom. He added that they still hope to be able to do this. They have contacted the chairman of the Lao Peace Committee. Laos has expressed an interest. But when they were informed that the Thai government might not participate, Laos lost interest.

Based on UN principles, the aim is to have private organizations play an active role in conjunction with the government-sponsored activities in order to achieve the best results possible. "When the entrusted this matter to the

Office of University Affairs and formulated projects, we (private organizations) saw the importance of this and wanted to implement our own project," said Dr Khothom.

The "peace boat" project will get underway in October. "This project should provide a good start. It should help solve the political problems in this region," said Dr Khothom in conclusion.

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ARMY SUPPORT FOR PREM, CHAWALIT DISCUSSED

Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai 19-25 May 86 pp 4, 5

[Unattributed report: "Urgent...Prem Advised To Suspend Athit and Replace Him With Chawalit Before There Is a Crisis"]

[Excerpt] Big Chiu's Most Important Game

A reliable news source revealed that the present political situation is forcing Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, or Big Chiu, to make his moves very carefully. Because if he makes a mistake, he will miss a golden opportunity. At the same time, in the present game, Big Chiu has the edge over the other faction. Because if things are done "fairly," Big Chiu will become the next RTA CINC. Besides this, the people still have a positive image of Big Chiu.

Reports state that even though Big Chiu has a mind like a computer and even though he has always been the "glue" binding Gen Prem and Gen Athit together, the present gulf between Gen Chawalit and Gen Athit is wider than at any time since the "no extension" issue. Even though the two had a chance to meet and talk on 8 May, there were no reports stating that there was a return to "old times."

The "trump" held by Big Chiu is none other than "Prem" and "Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy [CRMA] Class 5." Because the two power poles are so far apart, Gen Chawalit must do everything he can to ensure the survival of Gen Prem. Because maintaining the position of Gen Prem is tantamount to maintaining his own position and that of his friends.

The news report stated that several of the political parties that were established just recently, particularly the Citizens Party, of which Gen Thianchai Sirisamphan is party leader and Gen Mana Rattanakoset is secretary general, are strong allies of Big Chiu. Similarly, the National Democracy Party, in which Dr Saeng Sangwanruang and Bunthoeng Phonphanit are key activists, also sides with Prem and Chawalit. This confirms that Big Chiu is trying to find a way to enable Gen Prem to stay in power. However, keeping Gen Prem in power is now much more difficult than it used to be.

Prem's Losing Card for Chiu

In the political game, Gen Athit made the right decision in deciding to remain in both positions. This is a very important card held by Gen Athit.

A well-informed source agrees. He said that Athit and Big Chiu may have agreed to compromise if Big Chiu is willing to start over. But almost all news reports agree that Big Chiu is unlikely to choose that course, because that would do nothing to relieve the tension.

At a time when all factions have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, Prem, Athit and Chawalit have all confirmed that there will be an election and that they will not let anything happen. This means that the situation will reach a climax after the election on 27 July. But if this contest of nerves leads to a "military exercise," reports state that in his capacity as prime minister and minister of defense, Gen Prem is prepared to act "decisively" once again.

A news source close to Gen Prem said that even though Gen Prem has only 90 days left in office counting from 1 May, if too much pressure is put on him and there are indications that Big Chiu might not be appointed RTA CINC, Gen Prem is prepared to appoint Big Chiu RTA CINC before he [Prem] leaves office. If that is the case, it means that Gen Athit would hold the single position of supreme commander.

"The alignment of the forces was checked recently. Seventy percent still support the prime minister and army chief of staff. In particular, most members of CRMA Class 5 still support them," said the news source.

If things proceed in this manner, it means that Gen Prem will have played his trump card, his final card, as several lower-echelon factions have suggested. But if things do not proceed in this manner, it probably means that the two power poles will be able to reach an agreement.

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PREM AIDE GENERAL MONGKHON TO BE TRANSFERRED

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 14-20 May 86 pp 18-20

[Unattributed report: "Four Months Before the Annual Military Reshuffle; Prem Aide Will 'Return Home'"]

[Excerpt] Maj Gen Mongkhon Amphonphisit, who is currently attached to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, is considered to be the person who oversees political matters at Ban Sisao. Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, trusts him implicitly. He is frequently entrusted with important tasks concerning the government or political parties.

It is rumored that after the general election on 27 July, which will mark the end of the Prem administration that came to power in April 1983, Maj Gen Mongkhon give up his political duties at Ban Sisao in order to resume duties in the army. Besides the fact that the administration's term is drawing to a close, an important reason is that there will be a shift in power in the army after Athit leaves. The military path of Maj Gen Mongkhon will be much smoother when Big Chiu takes command.

Maj Gen Mongkhon is a member of CRMA Class 9. He is the first member of his class to be promoted to general. He was promoted to the rank of major general during the reshuffle in September 1984 and attached to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. It is thought that it was Gen Prem who pulled Maj Gen Mongkhon out the the army command stream in order to have him carry out political tasks while attached to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. This was done to "help" Maj Gen Mongkhon. Because prior to that, Maj Gen Mongkhon served as the commander of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division. At that time, the power center in the army often "clashed" with the government. But Maj Gen Mongkhon took the opposite viewpoint, and, therefore, it seemed very likely that he would be "picked" in the army. Thus, Gen Prem decided to assign him to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense.

Gen Mongkhon has long been closely associated with Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the man slated to become RIA CINC this September. It is said that while carrying on political work at Ban Sisao, he has served as Gen Chawalit's representative and worked side by side with Gen Prem.

Looking back at the events of 1-3 April 1981, Maj Gen Mongkhon played a major role at the special action headquarters of Gen Chawalit. He was one of the people responsible for getting Gen Prem away from Ban Sisao safely. This shows the confidence that both Gen Chawalit and Gen Prem have in him.

A news source close to Ban Sisao said that in September 1986, Maj Gen Mongkhon will again be given a command position in the army. He will definitely be appointed commander of a division, perhaps the 9th Division, in which he once served as a regimental commander. Or he might even be appointed commander of the 1st Division, which is the heart of the power center in the army. However, it is more likely that he will take command of the 9th Division. Because usually, the person appointed commander of the 1st Division must have served as a divisional commander previously.

As for the commander of the 1st Division, the present commander is Maj Gen Wimon Wongwanit. Although he has held this position for only 1 year, he may be promoted to deputy army area commander, because he served as the commander of a special forces division for 2 years. Another thing is that because he is a professional soldier and does not side with any faction, Maj Gen Wimon has had a difficult time during the year that he has held this position. A news source close to Maj Gen Wimon said that Maj Gen Wimon has frequently told fellow classmates that he would like to transfer back to the Special Warfare Command, because he helped build this unit and would be "happier" there. Thus, it is quite possible that the 1st Division will have a new commander this September.

"But even so, Maj Gen Mongkhon will not be appointed commander of the 1st Division. To be appointed to this position, you have to have great prestige in the command stream. But he will definitely be given command of a division," said a news source at Ban Sisao. He cited several other aides of Gen Prem as examples. When they returned to the army, many of them were given important positions. For example, when Col Surayut Chulanon, who used to handle matters concerning the administration's rice policy, returned to the army, he was appointed commander of the 1st Special Forces Regiment.

The news source also mentioned Lt Gen Chao Khongphunsin, a former aide to the minister of defense who is now attached to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to lieutenant general last year in order to gain the seniority needed to become the commander of National Security Command Headquarters, which is subordinate to Supreme Command Headquarters. This unit is one of the most important intelligence and security units. Because Lt Gen Chao has served as an aide, he is quite skilled in this work.

The news source also said that the work of maintaining security at Ban Sisao will become even more important. Because during periods of great political tension, those whose interests have been adversely affected often try to make an "assassination" attempt. Preparations have been made in earnest during the past period.

"Because the great majority of the military forces support the government, those whose interests have been affected cannot use their smaller forces to cause trouble. Thus, they have only one recourse, and they have constantly made attempts. This is still a possibility, particularly during the final 4 months before the reshuffle." said an army news source about the possibility of an assassination attempt.

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MAYOR CHAMLONG WANTS ELECTED PRIME MINISTER

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 31 Mar 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Chamlong Favors Revising the Constitution To Require Elected Prime Minister"]

[Excerpts] The governor of Bangkok Metropolitan agrees with those MPs who have proposed revising the constitution to have the people elect the prime minister. He said that in the present system, the prime minister lacks resolute power and can't take action against corrupt ministers. He said that there are nine corrupt ministers in the present administration. Some had shares in the Mae Nok Kaeo share fund.

On 30 March, the People's Coordinating Committee for Democracy invited Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang, the governor of Bangkok Metropolitan, to participate in a debate on the topic "The Lack of Political Stability." The debate was held at the Narai Hotel.

Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang said that he favors a system in which the prime minister, just like the governor of Bangkok Metropolitan, is elected by the people directly. He stressed that the administrative sector must be completely separate from the legislative sector in order to facilitate the work of the administrative sector.

Maj Gen Chamlong also discussed the efforts that have been made to solve the problems. He said that the present attempt to control the birth of political parties using this constitution is not the correct way to solve the problems. Instead, this has created two-party, two-headed MPs. No one can take action against those who violate the constitution.

Maj Gen Chamlong added that having elected administrators will have a good effect. This will enable the administrators to use their power more resolutely. And the more we improve democracy, the more resolutely the administrators will be able to use their powers. For example, he is now trying to improve sanitation and is receiving good cooperation from the people.

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INTERIOR MINISTER WANTS GENERAL MARONG EXTENDED

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 26 Apr 86 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] Gen Sitthi Chirarot, the minister of interior, turned 66 on 25 April. He talked about the transfer of police officers the day before yesterday, saying that this was a proper mid-year transfer. More transfers will be made at the end of the year. This time, the police officers said to be involved with casinos were not transferred to large police stations. A reporter asked whether Police Gen Marong Mahanon, the director-general of the Police Department whose 4-year term will expire soon, will be transferred or granted an extension. Gen Sitthi said that the director-general will remain in his position. There is no problem. Gen Marong has done a very good job and has made a great effort to solve the problems. He works very hard. For example, he attends many meetings in an attempt to solve problems and travels here and there. "He has the same ideals as I do. But when I leave this position, that will be up to the person who replaces me," said Gen Sitthi in confirming that Police Gen Marong will remain in his position as director-general.

The reporter asked about the rumors that a soldier would be made director-general or deputy director-general of the Police Department. Gen Sitthi replied that he has already said that the police are a separate entity. If those rumors are true, then the matter is being handled by those at the top and is out of his control. Otherwise, a police officer or a commander should be put in charge. The director-general of the Police Department must come from within the Police Department. These people have climbed their way up from police sublieutenant and have experience with the law. Who would know more about this than policemen? If anything happens, he was not the one who initiated it. Why would they want to take over? For the sake of power. As for taking over in order to improve the Police Department, he [Marong] has already taken action. Thus, Gen Sitthi opposes this. But if others don't want to listen, that is their affair.

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THAILAND

MPS DISCUSS, CRITICIZE WAR RESERVE STOCKPILE

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 4 May 86 pp 9, 10

[Unattributed report: "The War (Reserve) Stockpile, a Public Problem"]

[Excerpts] Khanin Bunsuwan, the Deputy Secretary General of the Democrat Party and an MP From Bangkok Metropolitan

In my view, the war reserve stockpile is not just a military matter. This is a complex matter that affects and concerns international relations. It does not concern relations between Thailand and the United States only. It also concerns relations between Thailand and other countries, particularly neighboring countries. Thus, the first thing I want to say is that this is a very complex matter that should be discussed widely. Discussion should not be limited to military circles. This should not be kept secret among military officials.

Another thing that must be considered is whether the establishment of a war reserve stockpile in Thailand will resemble, in part or totally, the establishment of an American military base in Thailand. The fact is, we really don't know any of the details about this. In this case, I think that the matter should be handled in the form of a treaty, which, according to the constitution, requires parliamentary approval. The administration can't go ahead with this on its own. But the government, the mass media and the people have not been provided with complete details on this. All that people have said is "war reserve stockpile." Some senior people in the administration have told us that there is nothing to worry about. Gen Sitthi (Chirarot) said this. I heard him. He said that there is nothing to worry about. That's all that has been said. But really, we don't know what is going on. Thus, they should inform the people. As I said, this is not a military problem that must be limited to military circles or treated as a military secret.

If this is not a military base or a part of a military base, it is probably something that is desired by the Thai administration as a means of defending the country. This would provide greater confidence if we were suddenly attacked by a hostile country. This is something that the government can handle by itself. The problem is, even if this does concern national defense measures, it is still necessary to obtain the approval of the people or parliament. Because today, our government has a rather limited budget. We have

to service our debts and compensate for the budget deficit. We have to stand security for the banks and financial institutions that face bankruptcy in order to protect the deposits of the people. There are many other such things. We have to prop up crop prices and give support to exporters. All of these things cost much money. And the military keeps asking for an increase in the military budget in order to purchase weapons to defend the country.

Looking at things from this angle, establishing a war reserve stockpile in Thailand is equivalent to purchasing weapons ahead of time. The only thing is that we will not have paid for them yet. From what they have said, we can use weapons from the war reserve stockpile whenever necessary and pay for them later. This shows that we have agreed to sign a weapons purchase contract. This should be discussed to determine whether this is suitable. Because today, parliament is responsible for overseeing military expenditures. If the administration feels that parliament is limiting military expenditures, this could be one way of getting around parliamentary control. If this is in fact the case, I think that that is wrong. Military expenditures affect the budget. Whether the weapons are purchased today, tomorrow or 10 years from now, the money all comes out of the government's budget. If we have the right to draw weapons from the stockpile at any time and pay for them later, this is tantamount to an advance purchase. This will definitely affect the budget. And it will not affect the budget of just this government. It will have an effect for generations to come. This is something that must be discussed in detail.

Pongphon Adireksan, a Thai Nation Party MP From Saraburi

I am aware of the fact that we lack artillery shells, small-arms ammunition, rockets, anti-tank weapons and other materials. These are the types of weapons that I mean. I don't mean nuclear weapons. Because nuclear weapons go beyond the national level. Thus, we must see what details the government can provide on this matter.

I think that this is an administrative matter. It is not tantamount to declaring war. I don't think it is necessary to promulgate a law. The Ministry of Defense can be entrusted with this matter, or the government can use its administrative powers.

Piyanat Watraphon, the Second Deputy Speaker of the House

Two hundred years ago, weapons were important in defending the country. But toady, if a real war breaks out, regardless of how efficient our weapons are, the chance of winning using force will be very small. Thus, in the present situation, our foreign policy should stress negotiations in order to find as many allies as possible. We must remain neutral in the conflicts between other countries. If we become involved in the various conflicts in the world, regardless of who is involved, this will pose a danger to Thailand. Because at the very least, we will unintentionally make more enemies. Because the enemies of our allies are our enemies. We should implement an internationalist policy and avoid becoming involved in the disputes of other countries.

Thus, in my view, we should have enough weapons to protect ourselves in an emergency. We don't need any more than that. I don't agree with stockpiling

weapons. That would not benefit national development. What is most important is that if the weapons stockpiled in Thailand actually belong to another country, the government will not be able to follow an independent policy line. Because the country that owns the weapons will undoubtedly work to maintain their own national interests. Thus, this is something with which politicians such as I tend to disagree.

As for whether or not this must be considered by the government if the administration's policy is to allow a war reserve stockpile to be established here, the constitution is not clear about this. This may require further clarification. But that would depend on what the administration wants, because it has a majority of the votes.

The term war reserve stockpile does not appear in the constitution. It discusses only the matter of concluding peace treaties and other treaties with other countries or international organizations. I am not certain whether this can be considered to be a treaty. It depends on the interpretation.

But from the standpoint of being an important policy in forging ties with another country, we should interpret this in such a way as to respect the rights of the people, the real masters of the country. A government that respects the power of the people should not do anything by force. This matter must be discussed with parliament, which represents the people. This would be beneficial. Because at the very least, it would enable the administration to feel that what it is doing has the support of the people. If parliament approves this, the administration can rest assured that it has the right to take this action. But if parliament criticizes anything, the matter can be discussed. And if parliament disagrees, the administration should respect the people's representatives. This depends on how broadminded each administration is.

Samak Sirichan, the First Deputy Speaker of the House and the Secretary General of the Thai Citizens Party

From what I have read in the newspapers, the press and some politicians feel that we are conceding too much. But this is not a matter of our giving up our sovereignty. This is a matter of their helping us maintain security. This will benefit us. Thus, I agree with Mr Prem that the Farm Act concerns Thailand. They are not trying to persecute us. They have to take action, too. If we promulgate a law to help the country survive, this might affect others. But we have to do this for the benefit of our country.

If a motion is submitted in parliament, I am sure that the administration will explain matters. Because they are representatives who have to explain things to the people. But things have to be done in stages. The motion must explain the advantages and disadvantages of this. The minister of defense or the prime ministers would probably come explain matters.

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THAILAND

MPS NOTE VOTE-BUYING, AFRAID TO NAME NAMES

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 2 May 86 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] A reporter reported that during the meeting on the afternoon of 1 May to debate the Land Transport Decree, Mr Khlaeo Norapoti, a National Democracy Party MP from Khon Kaen Province, said that he had received a telephone call that morning and that the caller had offered him 100,000 baht to vote against this decree. The caller said that he could pick up the money beforehand if he wanted. He feels that this administration has many enemies, including people who have lost power, people whose interests have been adversely affected and people who want power.

During the debate, Police Lt Chaowarin Latthasaksiri, a Thai Nation Party MP from Ratburi Province, said that a minister was distributing money in Subcommittee Conference Room 1 on the third floor. He said that Master Sergeant Songtham Panyadi, a Thai Nation Party MP from Chiang Rai Province, was taking down the names of MPs who entered and left the room. He asked photographers to go and take pictures. After that, Master Sergeant Songtham returned to the conference hall and said that payoffs had actually been made. He said that when he went to that room, he saw the minister in the room. Several MPs entered and then left. The minister left the room carrying an envelope and asked him if he wanted to take it.

While Master Sergeant Songtham was speaking, Lady Kanok Samsenwin, a Thai Citizens Party MP from Bangkok Metropolitan, protested and started arguing with Master Sergeant Songtham. Mr Uthai Phimchaichon, the speaker of the House, stopped the argument, saying that that matter had nothing to do with the topic of discussion and that they should discuss that outside the conference hall. Master Sergeant Songtham said that Mr Prachan Klaphotchana had been in that area, too. Mr Prachan immediately got up and denied any involvement. He had heard the minister tell an MP in the subcommittee room to move to another room. He said that that was all he knew and that he would be glad to prove that he had not accepted any money.

Master Sergeant Songtham later told reporters that before the meeting, a minister had asked about 10 Social Action Party MPs to meet him at the subcommittee conference room on the third floor. He saw the MPs gathered around the minister. The minister was holding a pen and a white envelope. Among the MPs in the room were Mr Phinya Chuaiplot, an MP from Surat Thani, Mr

Wirakon Khamprakop, an MP from Nakhon Sawan, and Mr Prachan Klaphotchana, a Thai Nation Party MP from Nakhon Ratchasima Province.

A reporter questioned Mr Phichai Rattakun, the leader of the Democrat Party, about the rumors that money was distributed to buy votes. Mr Phichai said that he did not know anything about this and did not want to say anything. He said that if this is true, it probably involved only a few MPs. If they did do that, that is very sad, because they were elected to protect the interests of the people. It is wrong for people to seek election to the House for personal gain. If the people find out who was involved, they don't have to vote for them next time.

Mr Phichai said that vote-buying in a democratic system upsets him. Some politicians are selfish and don't have the institution's interests at heart. He also discussed the matter of the two Democrat MPs, that is, Mr Chirayut Naowaketu, an MP from Satun, and Mr Sophon Phetsawang, an MP from Buriram. He said that they initially voted with the government. But later on, they walked out of the conference hall. The party will not let them attend any more party meetings. During the meeting, Mr Chirayut left the room even though Mr Karun Saengam, an MP from Buriram, tried to get him to stay. But he refused. And during the next election, the Democrat Party will not field them as candidates. However, if parliament is not dissolved, the party will not expel them from the party. That would only waste money, because a by-election would have to be held.

Mrs Suphatra Masadit, an MP from Nakhon Sithammarat, said that during the meeting, a well-known Democrat MP told Mr Thanong Siriprichaphong, a Social Action Party MP from Nakhon Phanom, to get Mr Wiang Worachet, a Democrat Party MP from Roi Et, out of the room no matter how much it cost. And the party will not talk about Police Cpt Chaloem Yubamrung, because everyone knows what he is doing.

One MP told MATICHON that payoffs were made in the clinic and the subcommittee conference room in Building 2 of parliament, both of which are located near the conference hall. The amount of the payoffs ranged from 40,000 to 100,000 baht per vote.

Mr Sommai Huntrakun, the minister of finance, talked with reporters about this. He said that he had just heard rumors from MPs but that he did not know enough to accuse anyone.

Mr Michai Ruchuphan, the minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, said that there had been vote-buying.

Mr Khlaeo said in an interview that he was afraid to reveal the name of the person who had offered him 100,000 baht, because the person is very influential. If he revealed his identity, he might be harmed. But this person is one of those whose interests have been adversely affected. He and one other party member were offered money. However, he abstained from voting because that is what the party resolution stipulated. He abstained even though he knew that that would benefit those who did not want the decree to pass.

At a party at the Oriental Hotel, in discussing these rumors, Police Cpt Surat said that people can say whatever they want. In parliament, people have the right to say whatever they want. "But could I do such a thing? Look at what kind of person I am. Regardless of what people say in parliament, no one will harbor any resentment. As for whether the opposition bought votes, I am not interested in what happened. If I were prime minister, I would dissolve parliament."

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THAILAND

NUMBERS OF MPS PER PROVINCE, INCREASES NOTED

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 4 May 86 p 3

[Unattributed report: "A Total of 347 MPs for 51 Million People; Increases for 22 Provinces"]

[Text] By Royal Command, the government dissolved parliament on 1 May and set 27 July 1986 as the date for the general parliamentary election. And based on the 1985 constitution, with the special provisions no longer in effect, the Ministry of Interior must hold a multiple constituencies, individual candidacy type election. Each constituency is allowed 1 MP for every 150,000 people plus 1 additional MP if the remaining number of people exceeds 75,000. The population figures to be used are those as of 31 December 1985.

As for dividing constituencies, the law states that any province with fewer than three MPs is to be considered a single constituency. Any province with more than three MPs is to be divided into constituencies. Each constituency is to have at least two and at most three MPs.

Data from the Population Registration Section, Department of Local Administration, show that as of 31 December 1985, Thailand's total population was 51,795,651 people. Thus, according to the criteria, there must be 347 MPs, an increase of 23 MPs as compared with the present number.

Twenty-two provinces will have more MPs than before. Those allowed one additional MP are: Khon Kaen, Chanthaburi, Chachoengsao, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Buriram, Pathumthani, Phetchabun, Maha Sarakham, Roi Et, Ratburi, Lamphun, Lopburi, Lampang, Sisaket, Sakon Nakhon, Songkhla, Surat Thani, Surin, Udon Thani, and Ubon Ratchathani. Nakhon Ratchasima will have two additional MPs.

Among these, the three provinces that can be considered to be a single constituency because of having fewer than four MPs are Chanthaburi, Pathumthani and Lamphun provinces. As for the other 19 provinces, the Ministry of Interior will hold a meeting on 8 May to divide the constituencies.

The population and number of MPs for each province are shown in the following table:

| Province | Population as of 31 December 1985 | Number of MPs | Number of New MPs |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Bangkok | 5,363,378 | 36 | - |
| 2. Krabi | 257,550 | 2 | - |
| 3. Kanchanaburi | 620,033 | 4 | - |
| 4. Kalasin | 820,673 | 5 | - |
| 5. Kamphaengphet | 621,243 | 4 | - |
| 6. Khon Kaen | 1,542,593 | 10 | 1 |
| 7. Chanthaburi | 390,346 | 3 | 1 |
| 8. Chachoengsao | 525,717 | 4 | 1 |
| 9. Chonburi | 806,396 | 5 | - |
| 10. Chainat | 339,478 | 2 | - |
| 11. Chaiyaphum | 945,307 | 6 | - |
| 12. Chumphon | 355,835 | 2 | - |
| 13. Chiang Rai | 981,129 | 7 | 1 |
| 14. Chiang Mai | 1,277,835 | 9 | - |
| 15. Trang | 469,263 | 3 | - |
| 16. Trat | 167,967 | 1 | - |
| 17. Tak | 318,844 | 2 | - |
| 18. Nakhon Ratchasima | 211,444 | 1 | - |
| 19. Nakhon Pathom | 609,316 | 4 | - |
| 20. Nakhon Phanom | 587,506 | 4 | - |
| 21. Nakhon Ratchasima | 2,187,165 | 15 | - |
| 22. Nakhon Si Thammarat | 1,352,237 | 9 | 2 |
| 23. Nakhon Sawan | 1,042,936 | 7 | - |
| 24. Nonthaburi | 504,424 | 3 | - |
| 25. Narathiwat | 493,089 | 3 | - |
| 26. Nan | 417,344 | 3 | - |
| 27. Wong Khai | 764,904 | 5 | - |
| 28. Buriram | 1,285,057 | 9 | 1 |
| 29. Pathumthani | 384,713 | 3 | - |
| 30. Prachuap Khiri Khan | 400,668 | 3 | - |
| 31. Prachinburi | 779,763 | 5 | - |
| 32. Pattani | 483,782 | 3 | - |
| 33. Ayuthaya | 652,977 | 4 | - |
| 34. Phayao | 480,420 | 3 | - |
| 35. Phangnga | 195,360 | 1 | - |
| 36. Phatthalung | 430,412 | 3 | - |
| 37. Phichit | 553,913 | 4 | - |
| 38. Phitsanulok | 735,052 | 5 | - |
| 39. Phetchaburi | 410,578 | 3 | - |
| 40. Phetchabun | 905,262 | 6 | 1 |
| 41. Phrae | 475,238 | 3 | - |
| 42. Phuket | 147,467 | 1 | - |
| 43. Mukdahan | 264,475 | 2 | - |
| 44. Mae Hong Son | 155,001 | 1 | - |
| 45. Maha Sarakham | 845,733 | 6 | 1 |
| 46. Yala | 306,362 | 2 | - |
| 47. Yasothon | 487,833 | 3 | - |
| 48. Roi Et | 1,147,300 | 8 | 1 |
| 49. Ranong | 98,142 | 1 | - |

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|-----|----|
| 50. Rayong | 418,814 | 3 | - |
| 51. Ratburi | 684,022 | 5 | 1 |
| 52. Lopburi | 695,992 | 5 | 1 |
| 53. Lampang | 737,144 | 5 | 1 |
| 54. Lamphun | 398,292 | 3 | 1 |
| 55. Loei | 511,290 | 3 | - |
| 56. Sisaket | 1,205,438 | 8 | 1 |
| 57. Sakon Nakhon | 885,941 | 6 | 1 |
| 58. Songkhla | 991,670 | 7 | 1 |
| 59. Satun | 192,406 | 1 | - |
| 60. Samut Prakan | 662,612 | 4 | - |
| 61. Samut Songkram | 203,418 | 1 | - |
| 62. Samut Sakhon | 315,373 | 2 | - |
| 63. Saraburi | 489,056 | 3 | - |
| 64. Singburi | 215,021 | 1 | - |
| 65. Sukhothai | 566,915 | 4 | - |
| 66. Suphanburi | 779,703 | 5 | - |
| 67. Surat Thani | 677,602 | 5 | 1 |
| 68. Surin | 1,175,598 | 8 | 1 |
| 69. Ang Thong | 270,941 | 2 | - |
| 70. Udon Thani | 1,668,037 | 11 | 1 |
| 71. Uttaradit | 441,730 | 3 | - |
| 72. Uthai Thani | 283,074 | 2 | - |
| 73. Ubon Ratchathani | 1,736,105 | 12 | 1 |
| Total for 73 provinces: | 51,795,651 | 347 | 23 |

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CHANGES IN ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES, NUMBER OF MPS REPORTED

Bangkok NABO MA in Thai 19 May 86 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Details on Changes in Provincial Electoral Constituencies"]

[Text] Acting on behalf of the under secretary of interior, Mr Asa Meksawan, the deputy under secretary of interior, signed the 1986 Ministry of Interior notice on the number of electoral constituencies in each province, the number of MPs in each constituency, and the localities that compose the constituencies in each province. Provinces with changes include:

| Province | Previous No of constituencies | Previous No of MPs | New Constituency | No of MPs |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|-----------|
| 1. Chachoengsao | 1 | 3 | 1. Muang District Bang Pakong Ban Pho Plaeng Yao | 2 |
| | | | 2. Bang Nam Piao Bang Khla Phanom Sarakham Ratchasan Sanam Chai | 2 |
| 2. Ratburi | 2 | 4 | 1. Chom Bung Photharam Ban Pong Bang Phae Damnoen Saduak | 3 |
| | | | 2. Suan Phung Pak Tho Muang Wat Phleng | 2 |

| | | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--|---|
| 3. Lopburi | 2 | 4 | 1. Muang Tha Wung Phattana Nikhom Ban Mi | 3 |
| | | | 2. Khok Samrong Chai Badan Tha Luang Sarabot | 2 |
| 4. Lampang | 2 | 4 | 1. Muang Hang Chat Chae Hom Ngao Wang Nua Muang Pan | 3 |
| | | | 2. Mae Moh Soemngam Ko Kha Mae Tha Sobprap Thoен Mae Phrik | 2 |
| 5. Surat Thani | 2 | 4 | 1. Muang Kanchanadit Don Sak Ko Samui Ko Phangan Ban Nasan Wiang Sa Phra Saeng Ban Nadoem Chai Buri | 3 |
| | | | 2. Phun Phin Tha Chang Chai Ya Tha Chana Khiri Ratnikhom Ban Takhun Phanom Khian Sa | 2 |
| 6. Phetchabun | 2 | 5 | 1. Muang Lomsak Lom Kao Nam Nao Khao Kho Wang Pong | 3 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|----|---|---|
| | | | 2. | Chon Daen Nong Phai Bung Samphan Wichianburi Sithep | 3 |
| 7. Maha Sarakham | 2 | 5 | 1. | Muang Wapiptum Kantharawichai Chiang Yun Kae Dam | 3 |
| | | | 2. | Kosum Phisai Borabu Na Chuak Phayakichaphum Phisai Na Dun | 3 |
| 8. Sakon Nakhon | 2 | 5 | 1. | Muang Phanna Nikhom Phang Khon Kut Bak Kusuman Tao Ngoi Khok Sisuphan | 3 |
| | | | 2. | Sawang Daendin Wanaraniwat Ban Muang Kham Takla Song Dao Akat Amnuai Maritphum Nikhom Nam Un | 3 |
| 9. Chiang Rai | 2 | 6 | 1. | Muang Mae Chan Mae Sai Chiang Saen | 3 |
| | | | 2. | Thoeng Chiang Khong Wieng Chai Phaya Mengrai | 2 |
| | | | 3. | Phan Wieng Papao Mae Saruai Pa Daet | 2 |

| | | | | |
|--------------|---|---|---|---|
| 10. Songkhla | 2 | 6 | 1. Muang Rattaphum Khuan Niang Ranot Krasaezin Sathingphra | 3 |
| | | | 2. Hat Yai Na Mom Bang Klam | 2 |
| | | | 3. Sadao Chana Nathawi Thepha Sabayoi | 2 |
| 11. Roi Et | 3 | 7 | 1. Pho Chai Muang Thawatburi Atsamarot | 3 |
| | | | 2. Phanom Phrai Suwannaphum Phon Sai Ket Wisai Chatuphak Phiman Muang Suang Pathumrat | 3 |
| | | | 3. Phon Thong Moei Wadi Nong Phok Selaphum | 2 |
| 12. Sisaket | 3 | 7 | 1. Rasi Salai Yangchum Noi Kanthararon Muang Nam Liang Non Khun | 3 |
| | | | 2. Bung Bun Uthumphon Phisai Huai Thapthan Prangku Phrai Bung Khukhan | 3 |
| | | | 3. Sirattana Kantharalak Khun Han | 2 |

| | | | | |
|----------------|---|---|---|---|
| 13. Surin | 3 | 7 | 1. Muang Prasat Kap Choeng Lam Duan | 3 |
| | | | 2. Chumphonburi Tha Tum Rattanaburi Chom Phra Sanom Sam Rongthap | 3 |
| | | | 3. Sikkhoraphum Sangkha Bua Chet | |
| 14. Chiang Mai | 3 | 8 | 1. Muang Doi Saket Sankampaeng Saraphi | 3 |
| | | | 2. Chiang Dao Mae Taeng Mae Rim Pang Mae Ai Phrao San Sai Wiang Haeng | 3 |
| | | | 3. Chom Thong Mae Chaem Samoeng Sanpatong Hang Dong Hot Doi Tao Om Koi | 3 |
| 15. Buriram | 3 | 8 | 1. Satuk Khu Muang Phutthaisong Napho Lam Plainat Nonghong | 3 |
| | | | 2. Nong Ki Nang rong Pakham Lahansai Ban Kruat | 3 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------|---|----|----|--|---|
| | | | 3. | Muang Prakhonchai Krasang | 3 |
| 16. Khon Kaen | 3 | 9 | 1. | Muang Ban Fang Manchakhiri | 3 |
| | | | 2. | Ban Phai Puai Noi Nong Songhong Phon Waeng Noi Waeng Yai Chonnabot Phra Yun | 3 |
| | | | 3. | Chum Phae Phuphaman Si Chomphu Phu Wiang | 2 |
| | | | 4. | Khao Suankwang Ubonrat Nam Phong Kranuan Nongrua | 2 |
| 17. Udon Thani | 4 | 10 | 1. | Nam Som Suwannakhuha Ban Phu Na Klang Kut Chap Nong Bualamphu | 3 |
| | | | 2. | [As published] | |
| | | | 3. | Ban Dung Thung Fon Nong Han Chaiyawan Kum Phawapi Sithatu Wang Sammo | 3 |
| | | | 4. | Sibunruang Non Sang Nong Muaso Nong Saeng Non Sa-at | 2 |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|----|---|---|
| 18. Ubon Ratchathani | 4 | 11 | 1. Muang Warin Chamrap Samrong | 3 |
| | | | 2. Phibun Mangsahan Det Udom Nam Yun Na Chalui Buntharik | 3 |
| | | | 3. Amnat Charoen Phana Hua Taphan Muang Samsip Khuang Mai | 3 |
| | | | 4. Senangkhanikhom Chanuman Kut Chaopun Khemarat Trakanphutphon Si Muang Mai Khong Chiam Phothisai Tansum | 3 |
| 19. Nakhon Ratchasima | 5 | 13 | 1. Muang Sungnoen | 3 |
| | | | 2. Pak Thongchai Pak Chong Sikhiu Dan Khunthot | 3 |
| | | | 3. Huai Thalaeng Chakrarat Chok Chai Nong Bunnak Khonburi Soengsang | 3 |
| | | | 4. Non Sung Phimai Chumphon Prathai | 3 |

5. Kham Thale so 3

Non Thai
Kham Sakaesaeng
Khong
Ban Liam
Bua Yai
Kaeng Sanam Nang

20. Bangkok: The number of MPs (36) and the number of constituencies (12) are the same as in the 1983 election. However, for this election, the constituencies have been rearranged as follows:

1. Dusit (excluding Si Yaek Mahanakhon and Suan Chitlada)

2. Phra Nakhon
Pom Prapsatruphai
Pathumwan
Bang Rak
Samphanthawong

3. Phyathai
Si Yaek Mahanak
Suan Chitlada

4. Phra Khanong (excluding Khlong Tan and Khlong Toei)
Lat Krabang

5. Huai Khwang
Khlong Tan
Khlong Toei

6. Yannawa

7. Bang Khen

8. Bang Kabi
Nong Chok
Minburi

9. Thonburi
Khlong San

10. Bang Khun Thian
Ratsadon Burana

11. Bangkok Noi
Talingchan

12. Phasi Charoen
Bangkok Yai
Nong Khaem

Based on the Ministry of Interior's division of constituencies, the province with the largest number of MPs is Bangkok Metropolitan with 36. This is followed by Nakhon Ratchasima with 15, Ubon Ratchathani with 12, Udon Thani with 11, Khon Kaen with 10, and Nakhon Sithammarat, Buriram, and Chiang Mai, each of which have 9 MPs. Surin, Sisaket, and Roi Et each have eight MPs. Songkhla, Nakhon Sawan, and Chiang Rai each have seven. Sakon Nakhon, Maha Sarakham, Phetchabun, and Chaiyaphum each have six. Surat Thani, Suphanburi, Lampang, Lopburi, Ratburi, Phitsanulok, Prachinburi, Nong Khai, Chonburi, and Kalasin each have five. Sukhothai, Samut Prakan, Phichit, Ayuthaya, Nakhon Phanom, Nakhon Pathom, Chachoengsao, Kamphaengphet, and Kanchanaburi each have four. Uttaradit, Saraburi, Loei, Lamphun, Rayong, Yasothon, Phrai, Phetburi, Phatthalung, Phayao, Pattani, Prachuap Khiri Khan, Pathumthani, Nan, Narathiwat, Nonthaburi, Trang, and Chanthaburi each have three MPs.

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ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PROFILED

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 28 Apr 86 p 5

[DAILY NEWS Square column by Manthana: "Lt Gen Charat Wongsayan, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Will Probably Be Promoted to Full General This October"]

[Text] Lt Gen Charat Wongsayan, the deputy chief of staff of the army, was born on 9 February 1927. Thus, he will retire on 30 September 1988, because he was born before 1 April before the retirement age for government officials was changed. His father, Charoenprasat, was a native of Phetburi who later moved to Prachinburi Province. His mother was Mrs Soemsuk Wonsayan. Altogether, they had nine children, five sons and four daughters. Three of the sons, Lt Gen Charat, Maj Gen Charan (who died recently and who will be cremated on Tuesday, 29 April at 1700 hours at Wat Somanatsaworawihan), and Lt Gen Charuai, who has been introduced in this column before, chose military careers.

Lt Gen Charat Wonsayan is an alumnus of Thepsirin School. He then attended the Army Prepatory School as a member of Class 7, the same class as Police Gen Suwan Rattanachun, Police Lt Gen Sane Sitthiphan, Lt Gen Uthai Kokilanon and Air Marshal Suraphon Sophaphong. Following that, he attended the Army Academy. He also attended the Technical School and graduated as an engineer. After completing his schooling, he served as an engineer in various units.

He also attended the Army Command and General Staff College while on active duty with various units. Following that, he attended the Army War College. He then attended the army engineering school in the United States. Shortly after returning to Thailand, he was sent to attend the U.S. Army Special Forces School. Later on, he attended the National Defense College as a member of Class 24, the same class as Danai Siyaphai.

He was promoted to major general and appointed deputy chief of the Office of the Army Comptroller in 1981. Following that, he was promoted to lieutenant general and made chief of the Office of the Army Comptroller. He was appointed deputy army chief of staff in October 1985.

He is married to Wongnut Tirawat, an instructor at the Saowapha Women's College. They have three sons, Nit, who attends Yothinburana School, Chulanit, a student at Wat Thepsairin, and Yuwanit, who attends Wat Thepsairin School, and one daughter, Hatchana, who attends Rachinilang School.

Maj Gen Charat likes simple food and prefers to eat at home. He rarely goes out to eat, because he doesn't want to waste money. At home, he likes to read and walk about his home. He likes to lead a quite life. He occasionally plays a round of golf.

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THAILAND

COMMERCE MINISTER PROFILED, POLICY STANDS NOTED

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 27 Apr 86 p 13

[Occupational Hand column: "Police Cpt Surat Osathanukhro, the Minister of Commerce"]

[Text] Police Cpt Surat Osathanukhro replaced Mr Koson Krairuk as commerce minister on 15 January 1986. Mr Koson had to resign because of political pressures from both inside and outside the party, pressures stemming from the rice problem. Police Cpt Surat has been in charge of the commerce ministry for a little over 3 months now. But in this short time, he has had to deal with one crisis after another in the Ministry of Commerce.

Before taking this position, Police Cpt Surat was a businessman in the Osathasapha business empire and had business dealings with several other corporations. His business activities have earned him a fortune. But it is said that politics is much more difficult than business. Even though he is not new to politics and has much political experience, he will have to feel his way carefully.

The present minister of commerce graduated from Saint Stevens College in Hong Kong. He earned his bachelors degree in business administration from the University of Colorado in the United States. After that, he joined the police force and was made a police captain, a title that he still uses. He resigned from the police force to join the family business. He served as the managing director of the Osathasapha Company.

Police Cpt Surat first became involved in politics when he joined the Democrat Party in 1969. He served as an MP from Bangkok Metropolitan. In 1975 he was the campaign manager of the Democrat Party. He served as minister of communications during the days that ML [royal title--FBIS] Seni Pramot was prime minister. Following that, he left the Democrat Party and established the Rachaphruk Group. He then joined the Social Action Party, serving as one of the party's deputy leaders. He ran for election in Khon Kaen and was elected MP from that province. When the government was formed, he was given the position of deputy minister of interior. But because of an illness, he had to resign his position. And now, the Social Action Party has entrusted him with the difficult position of minister of commerce, the position that Mr Koson had held for more than 3 years.

Since being appointed to this position, Police Cpt Surat has stunned people by transferring several senior bureaucrats and announcing a free rice trade policy. He has eliminated many of the obstacles hindering exports using cabinet resolutions. In effect, he has thrown out the policies of Mr Koson.

Now that market mechanisms are being allowed to determine the direction of rice prices, Police Cpt Surat is confident that domestic paddy prices will rise in the near future. He said that paddy prices would definitely rise within a month after this new policy went into effect. But after 3 months, farmers' paddy prices are even lower than they were when Mr Koson was minister.

Besides this, the rice situation abroad is still in turmoil because of the U.S. Farm Act. Because of this act, rice prices show no signs of rising. And this is the time when farmers have little rice left on hand. Members of the Social Action Party brought up the rice problem at a party meeting last week. Police Cpt Surat had to confront this issue. But fortunately for him, the problems have not gotten out of hand. He has not been criticized too much. He has not been attacked like the previous minister.

Besides the rice crisis, the minister of commerce has also had to deal with the storm arising from allowing the Asia Livestock Company and the Senthako Company to import 26,000 tons of soybean waste. This dismayed officials in the Department of Foreign Trade and people in trade circles. Because according to the regulations on importing soybean waste, companies must purchase three parts domestically for every four parts that they import. But these two companies have not produced any import documents.

People have been criticizing this for a long time. Police Cpt Surat has said that "this is just a technical error." Before he signed the permit, Department of Foreign Trade officials forgot to attach the 1985 cabinet resolution on importing soybean waste. All they attached was the old 1984 regulation.

Regardless of how the minister of commerce deals with the criticisms, he has not been able to deflect the criticism entirely. In addition, Mr Chia Kokphon, the president of the Fishermen's Association and the former secretary to Mr Koson Krairuk, is complaining that allowing imports of soybean waste to flood the country has caused the price of "duck fish" to drop from 2 baht to only 1 baht per kg. This is causing serious problems for fishermen.

But regardless of all the crises that he has had to face, Police Cpt Surat has managed to hold on to his job.

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THAILAND

RICE BANK IN JEOPARDY, FUNDS UNAVAILABLE

Bangkok NABO NA in Thai 27 Apr 86 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "The Rice Bank Is in Jeopardy; Where Are the Funds?"]

[Text] The Rice Bank is still in jeopardy. The initial results are still being evaluated in order to determine what can be done. The economic cabinet has not issued a resolution stating from where the money to purchase rice will come. If the Ministry of Commerce purchases the rice itself, the merchants will stop making purchases in order to wait to corner the market when rice stocks overflow.

As for solving the domestic rice price problem by establishing a rice bank based on the resolution issued by the economic cabinet, on 26 April, a senior official in the Ministry of Commerce said that this is presently under study at the ministry level. Based on an initial evaluation, it will be difficult to establish a rice bank. The cabinet resolution on this states only that this has been approved in principle. It does not go into the important details. In particular, it does not say from where the money for this project will come.

The news source said that obtaining money to establish the rice bank by suing the United States for damages is probably not a realistic possibility. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has never authorized awarding damages to a country. For example, when Thailand suffered damages as a result of the United States cutting import quotas on sugar, the United States compensated Thailand by importing other goods equal in value to the losses suffered by Thailand. As for obtaining the money from the Farmers Welfare Fund, that is impossible, because there is very little money in the fund.

The Ministry of Commerce official also said that if the Ministry of Commerce purchases the rice itself, the result will be that the merchants will stop purchasing rice. Instead, they will wait until the rice stocks are full. The rice exporters will profit by purchasing the surplus rice from Ministry of Commerce stocks. But the domestic price of rice will fluctuate even more.

The news source also said that if the Ministry of Commerce purchases rice, it, too, will experience financial problems. Distribution to low-income people is difficult to carry out in actual practice.

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THAILAND

SOLUTIONS TO FARM CRISIS VIEWED, GOVERNMENT INACTION SEEN

Editorial Urges Support for Prices

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 30 Apr 86 p 5

[Editorial: "The Rice Bank Policy"]

[Text] The policy of the former minister of commerce failed to raise rice prices, and this led to a cabinet reshuffle. The prime minister agreed to reshuffle the cabinet and appoint a new minister of commerce. Mr Koson Krairuk, the old minister of commerce, was replaced by Police Col Surat Osathanukhro.

But since this change in the commerce ministry, our rice trade situation has grown even worse. The old system has been abolished and a free trade system implemented. Rice exporters are no longer required to stockpile rice, and the rice premium has been abolished. But rice sales abroad have been even more disappointing than before. The price at which farmers can sell their rice has fallen even further. Today, farmers are getting less than 2,000 baht per ton for their rice. And now, to make things even worse, the United States has implemented a law known as the Farm Act.

This law is putting great pressure on Thai rice, and this affects us greatly. But as the representatives of the American people, U.S. congressmen must take action to help the American people. Thus, it is up to the government to solve this problem. It isn't necessary to take a hostile attitude toward them as some ministers have done. That will not achieve anything. Because national problems are not like family problems. We can't become emotional. This affects the Thai people. They, too, may feel a great sense of responsibility toward the country.

There have been reports that the government has agreed to establish a rice bank. One billion baht will be used to purchase rice from the farmers at a suitable price. This is the right way to solve this problem. We support this. As for the money that will be spent on this, people can't say that we don't have sufficient money. Because the government has been able to find money for things that are less urgent than the rice problem. For example, it has spent millions of baht to create jobs in the rural areas, which is like throwing money into the river.

We hope that the government will take serious steps to implement this policy in order to help the farmers, who make up the bulk of the population, and not drag its feet or claim that it doesn't have enough money.

Farmer Leader Raps Government

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 25 Apr 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Farmers Charge That the Government Is Incompetent"]

[Text] A farm leader is "heartbroken" about what the government has done to solve the Farm Act problem. He said that the country's leaders are incompetent. He will propose that opposition and government MPs promulgate a law to give real help to the farmers.

On the morning of 24 April, Mr Ubonsak Bualuangngam, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Central Region Farmers Group and the president of the Farmers Federation of Thailand, revealed that the Central Committee of the Farmers Group had held a meeting recently in order to discuss the effects that the U.S. Farm Act will have on Thai farmers. The meeting concluded that regardless of whether or not the Farm Act is implemented, the government is incapable of raising rice prices. The country's present leaders are incompetent and irresolute. They are not sincere about solving the problems facing the farmers.

Mr Ubonsak said that paddy prices are now very low. And in some places, farmers can't sell their rice even though prices are low. The rice mills won't purchase the rice. No one knows what the government will do to solve this problem.

Mr Ubonsak said that the Central Committee of the Farmers Group has watched the government constantly to see what steps it will take to deal with the Farm Act. The government has not taken any resolute action. Instead it has just issued statements to conceal its mistakes and shift the blame for the problems to the Farm Act. For this reason, the Central Committee of the Farmers Group has issued a resolution to submit a letter to the government and to both government and opposition MPs asking them to join together to promulgate a law or act to help the farmers, such as submitting an Agricultural Council or Farmers Council of Thailand act.

Besides this, the Central Committee of the Farmers Group will submit a letter to the government asking how much money was put into the Farmers Welfare Fund, for what projects the government has spent money, and how much money is left in the fund. If the government cannot answer these questions, the farmers will establish their own committee to audit the government's accounts.

Columnist Analyzes Farm Problems

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 24 Apr 86 p 3

[Short Jab column by Hoenfa Kindin: "The Rice-Farmer Problem and the Real Cause"]

[Text] The sounds of struggle against the United States on the rice market issue have faded. Instead, people are thinking about relying on the United States to establish a rice bank. We should stop dreaming. We should look carefully at the rice and farm problems in our country and figure out exactly what the problems are.

I talked with an expert on farm and rice matters who is not an advisor to the prime minister. He said that the main cause of the farm, or rice, problem is here in Thailand and that we shouldn't put all the blame on the Farm Act. The U.S. government is trying to help the American farmers. We should find a way to help our farmers reduce production costs. We should not reduce the area planted in rice. We have been growing rice for generations. That would upset the farmers greatly.

Today, in growing crops, farmers have to spend money on a wide variety of things. For example, they have to purchase good seed, fertilizer and insecticides. They have to hire people to do the harvesting, and they have to rent land.

Farmers really do have to spend money on these things, and they have to wait a long time each year before they earn a return on their investment. Today, to grow rice, farmers have to spend, or invest, almost 3,000 baht per kwian [1 kwian equals 2,000 liters]. But reports state that they can sell their rice for only 1,200-1,500 baht per kwian, which is much less than wealthy people pay for a pair of shoes.

An expert told me that Thai farmers have to pay three times as much for fertilizers and insecticides as do Japanese farmers. But Japanese farmers can sell their rice for about twice as much as Thai farmers. One reason is that fertilizers and insecticides are expensive. About 90 percent of these are imported. Another reason is that a few Thai merchants have a monopoly on these items and so they can make huge profits. The government could do much to help the farmers just by reducing the cost of these two items. The government could do this easily if it were really serious about helping the farmers instead of being concerned about the interests of just a few people.

Besides this, if people are really as sincere about wanting to help the farmers as they say they are, it's time to admit that one thing that is pushing up rice production costs is the land problem. Little of the land owned by the farmers is worth much. Usually, the fertile land that is suitable for growing good-quality rice has to be rented.

Surveys have shown that in the country's primary rice growing areas, such as Ayuthaya, Ang Thong, Suphanburi, Singburi and Nakhon Sawan, few farmers own their own land. Almost all of the rice consumed domestically and sold abroad

comes from this region. But most of the farmers have to rent the land. This is another reason for the high production costs. The government could do a lot to help reduce this production expense if it was sincere about carrying out land reform. Put yourself in the place of Thai farmers and think about the causes of the poverty and debt.

First, they have to purchase rice seed. They then have to invest labor and hire people to do the plowing and sowing. They have to find money to purchase fertilizer and insecticide. Then they have to hire people to harvest and thresh the rice. There are also transport costs, land rent costs and various other costs. The only way that farmers can get money to pay for these things is to borrow the money. Surveys have shown that the interest paid by many farmers in the central region is about equal to the amount paid in rent.

But all these investments are for nothing if they can't sell their rice for a profit. Today, rice is selling for about 1,200-1,500 baht per kwian. Thus, all their efforts have clearly been wasted. The chronic poverty and vicious circle of debt continue without any end in sight. They have to borrow more money in order to plant another crop of rice. This goes on and on. The golden land of justice cannot be seen because of all the tears and suffering.

Doubts Raised Over Rice Bank

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 23 Apr 86 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "The Rice Bank, an Effort To Obtain Damages"]

[Text] Action is being taken on the Rice Bank. Commerce is prodding the U.S. embassy in Thailand to ask Washington for damages. Agriculture points out that this is an old project of the king. Farm leaders are afraid that the Rice Bank will collapse and that there will be problems in the future because of the government and the private sector competing for rice markets.

The economic cabinet issued a resolution on establishing a rice bank in order to solve the Farm Act problem. The Ministry of Commerce has been put in charge of this. The Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Flying Officer Suli Mahasanthana, the minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, are cooperating in the effort to find funds both here and abroad in order to implement this project as soon as possible.

On the morning of 22 April, Mr Wichan Niwatwong, the under secretary of commerce, talked about this matter. He said that he is very concerned because this is just a supplementary measure. The primary thing is to export as much rice as possible. But if the various sectors all provide support, the rice bank will definitely become a reality.

As for having the United States provide financial support, Mr Wichan said that we have consulted experts and asked them what effect this will have on our rice sales. Some have said that our rice sales will drop about 200,000-300,000 tons, which amounts to approximatley 800-1,000 million baht. Thus, we could do this if we obtained the money from the Department of Internal Trade or from the Farmers Welfare Fund.

The reporter asked who would purchase the rice. Mr Wichan said that the Ministry of Agriculture should do this, because it knows the rice mills and farmers and already has an apparatus in place.

Furthermore, as for obtaining funds to support this project, a news report states that the U.S. embassy in Thailand has been contacted in order to have it contact the U.S. government on this cabinet resolution.

Dr Thaloeng Thamrongnawasawat, the under secretary of agriculture and cooperatives, told reporters that steps have already been taken to implement this project on a small scale. It was the king who originally thought of this. However, if the Ministry of Commerce wants to turn this into a national project, the matter will have to be considered further. He doesn't see anything strange about this. This will help the farmers.

Dr Thaloeng said that as for the feasibility of this, the stages and activities must be considered in much greater detail. In particular, storing the rice poses difficulties. Also, the cabinet approved this in principle only recently. The three ministries concerned have not yet held a meeting. He doesn't know whether this meeting will be a meeting of senior or lower level officials.

The under secretary of agriculture and cooperatives also said that because of the collapse of the cooperative system, people have not been able to cooperate and, therefore, they do not have much bargaining power. He said that this is not the fault of government officials. This is the fault of the private sector and the farmers themselves. The ministry just sets policy and gives support. If the farmers or cooperatives can't work together, it is difficult for the state to provide help.

Mr Charat Phuachuai, the secretary to the minister of agriculture and cooperatives, said that the establishment of a rice bank will have to be discussed in much greater detail. We have to be sure that this will actually benefit the farmers. When the stock and premium measures were abolished, the farmers did not benefit at all.

Besides this, there are financial problems. The Ministry of Finance is complaining that it doesn't have enough money. There aren't sufficient funds in the Farmers Welfare Fund. And it will be difficult to obtain the money from the United States. Thailand and the United States do not have any ties. At a time when their farmers are experiencing difficulties, they will definitely not provide any financial support to help the farmers of a competitor.

Mr Prarom Buasamli, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Farmers Group of Thailand, told reporters that problems will probably arise if a rice bank is established. Government rice stocks will gradually grow, because not too much will be used each year to help the poor people. If the government's stocks grow, the government and the private sector will compete for markets. There will probably be a fierce fight between the two sectors. Thus, this matter should be considered very carefully in order to determine whether this really will help the farmers. He said that even though he is a farmer, he is

against the government trying to provide help if they don't use the right method. However, not much can be said at this point, because there is no reliable data.

Editorial Comments on Farmers' Discontent

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Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 28 Apr 86 p 3

[Editorial: "Sounds From the Farmers"]

[Excerpts] At the recent meeting of the Central Committee of the Central Region Farmers Group, members discussed the effects that the U.S. Farm Act will have on Thai farmers. Those at the meeting concluded that regardless of whether or not the Farm Act is implemented, the Thai government does not have the capabilities to raise rice prices. The present leaders of the country are incompetent and irresolute. They are not sincere about solving the problems facing the farmers.

This conclusion by the Central Region Farmers Group was a real insult to the government. But it did not intend to criticize the government maliciously. This criticism was aimed at the government's actions. People in a democracy have the right to do this. This was meant as constructive criticism.

The conclusion reached by the Farmers Group is quite accurate. Today, paddy prices are very depressed. And in some places, the farmers can't sell their rice even though prices are very low. The rice mills won't buy the rice, and the government doesn't have any idea about what to do to solve this problem.

This meeting of the Farmers Group is a good reflection of the government's capabilities in solving the problems facing the farmers, who make up the majority of the people in the country. The meeting was aimed at prodding the government to become more serious about solving these problems instead of ignoring the problems and profiting at the expense of the farmers. In particular, the government should clearly state what the money in the Farmers Welfare Fund is being used for and how much this has helped the farmers.

The proposal to establish a Rice Farmers Council is worth considering. Rice farmers are the largest interest group in the country. To date, they have not been able to join together in order to bargain on matters affecting their interests. This is different from other agricultural groups, such as the sugar cane growers. If a Rice Farmers Council is established, it will definitely be able to protect its interests. The MPs and the government should support this idea.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAM

GENERAL THAI ON HO'S MILITARY CONCEPTS

BK060945 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 13-16 May 86

("First installment" of a 4-installment articld by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Some Reflections on Uncle Ho's Military Concepts")

[Part 1, 13 May 86 p 3]

[Text] When studying President Ho Chi Minh's military concepts, I first came up with a general idea--which I believe we have all realized--that this is part of Uncle Ho's revolutionary concepts or, in other words, this originates from and reflects Uncle Ho's revolutionary concepts in the military area. And Uncle Ho's revolutionary and military concepts in turn originate from Marxism-Leninism which has been tailored to suite the specific situation of the Vietnamese revolution. We have usually told one another that "We can only understand Uncle Ho's military concepts if we fully understand his revolutionary concepts." If we understand this otherwise, it will be tantamount to a jungle traveler seeing no jungle but only trees. I realize that we must understand Uncle Ho's military concepts in an integrated and comprehensive sense as his military concepts do not bear any pure military character. This is also the organic relationship between military and political lines found in Uncle Ho's military concepts.

I get very excited every time I recall the story about our Uncle reading Lenin's thesis on nations and colonies. Our Uncle, "overcome with joy, felt like crying" as he had found out for his poor compatriots "what we should do": "There is no way to achieve national liberation other than through proletarian revolution." Our Uncle then observed that "colonialism in itself is an act of violence by the strong against the weak." Therefore, our Uncle asserted: "In the hard struggle against the enemy of the working class and of the nation, it is necessary to use revolutionary violence against counterrevolutionary violence in order to regain and defend the power." But the violence advocated by the Uncle is always the violence of the masses. That is why our Uncle introduced all-people's uprising and all-people's resistance into the Vietnamese revolution. And in 1941 at the party Central Committee's Eighth Plenum our Uncle and party affirmed that the Indochinese revolution could begin with partial uprisings and end with a full-scale armed uprising. The purpose of uprisings and of war is always to achieve the goal: National independence and socialism. This objective demonstrates the people's sacred aspirations

while reflecting the truth of our time. National independence must be linked with socialism. Therefore, the waging of an uprising or a war is, in fact, for the people and by the people to save the country as well as the people and to liberate the society as well as the workers.

From this fundamental point, I have realized that revolutionary force is the foundation of the revolutionary armed forces. This is because the goal of the revolution has decided the very organic relationship between political and military fields while creating the possibility of mobilizing the force of the entire people to stage revolutionary violence and wage war.

Also from this fundamental point I have realized that military strategy and tactics on the battlefield are guided by revolutionary strategy and policies through appropriate procedures and forms. It can also be said that politics decide military victories. That is the essence of our Uncle's military concepts and of our party's military line.

As a result, President Ho Chi Minh always taught our military officers that they "must study politics, because military without politics is like a tree without roots--useless and detrimental." In October, 1951, Uncle Ho said realistically that: "To study, understand, and correctly carry out the party political platform and policy is tantamount to implementing Marxism-Leninism. In formulating our party political platform and policy for the war of resistance and national construction, we applied Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our revolution. For you military officers, your knowledge in politics will be used during your combat against the enemy."

I profoundly realized that if we do not understand Uncle Ho's revolutionary concept then we will not correctly understand his military viewpoint. For this reason, I think that our revolutionary military officers must not only acquire the pure military concept, but they must also acquire the knowledge of politics and military. This means that they must master the military art while fostering their political aptitude and enhancing their political background.

Uncle Ho's revolutionary concept bears a boundless meaning which we cannot easily describe comprehensively and profoundly, especially when we want to analyze the organic relationship between his revolutionary and political concepts.

For example: The problem of party leadership in the time of war and in the army, the problem of all-people unity, the problem of worker-peasant alliance, the problem of arms and politics, the problem of nationalities in time of war and in the army, all these are basic problems of the revolution and the vital problems of the revolutionary war, especially the military aspect.

The studies and researches of Uncle Ho's revolutionary and military concepts require much effort, projects, times, and many people to complete the task.

My research of Uncle Ho is very heartfelt, but it is only a beginning. However, I earnestly hope that my small task will contribute to the success of the general research. Noting all the heartiest points regarding problems of military concept of Uncle Ho, I feel that this concept has always helped shed light on my research.

The first point which I see clearly is that military officers must understand and firmly grasp the inevitability of the path of revolutionary violence. This was the stemming point of Uncle Ho's military concept. He pointed out: "We must use revolutionary violence to oppose counterrevolutionary violence." We must stick to revolutionary violence and not "revolutionary reformism."

Uncle Ho held this view consistently and persistently in his whole life of revolutionary struggle. This view was reflected in our Uncle's leadership and guidance in the process of propagating the revolution and stepping up the revolutionary war. In his appeal for the founding of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1930, our Uncle said: "Because of the oppression and inhuman exploitation by French imperialism, our compatriots have come to realize that with the revolution, we survive; without the revolution, we die." As far as I remember, in his 6 June 1941 message to the compatriots in which he used the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, our Uncle reminded us that "regarding the national interest in liberation above all, we must be united to topple the imperialist and the Vietnamese Quislings in order to save the country from its sorry state." And nobody can forget what our Uncle told us when we were preparing for the uprising: "We must strive to regain independence even if we have to burn down the Truong Son Cordillera."

When the French aggressors returned from the intention of seizing our country for the second time, our Uncle gave this order: "As long as a colonialist soldier remains in Vietnam, we will continue to fight and will fight until total victory." Then came the years when our nation was compelled to fight the contemporary Huns, namely the U.S. imperialists, our Uncle urged: "As long as there remains one aggressor in our country, we will have to continue fighting to sweep him away." National independence cannot be achieved by begging. Instead, we need revolutionary violence of a violent revolution. The revolutionary armed forces must always be worthy of being a tool of violent revolution in "cleanly sweeping away" all aggressor armies and regaining and defending national independence.

Secondly, I have profoundly realized that the most striking essence of our Uncle's military concepts is his concepts about people's war. From his boundless confidence in the invincible strength of the people to his concepts about mass uprising and about all-people revolutionary war, there emerges an assertion that violence here must always be understood as the violence of the masses. Uncle pointed out: "If we want to have a successful revolution, we must rely chiefly on the people." "Once the people are strong, no armies and no weapons can resist them." This is the departure point for the concepts about people's war.

Regarding confidence in the strength of the people, as far back as 1921, our Uncle wrote: "Behind their tentative subservience, the Indochinese people are hiding something which is boiling and screaming and which will explode violently when the opportunity arises. In his 19 June 1947 letter calling on the people to step up their protracted war of resistance our Uncle wrote: "The unity of minds of our compatriots has been transformed into a brass wall

around the fatherland. Regardless of how cruel and crafty the enemy may be, they will be defeated should they challenge this wall."

Our Uncle's concepts about people's war stemmed from this confidence, and also with this confidence our Uncle mastered and developed the strength of the entire people to create an invincible strength for the people's war. Therefore, the appeal made by our Uncle in 1946 that "every Vietnamese citizen, irrespective of sex, age, religious belief, political affiliation, and ethnic background, should rise up to fight French colonialism for national salvation" quickly became a reality during the all-the-people-fight-the-enemy resistance.

In 1944, while studying a directive on the founding of the Vietnam Armed Propaganda Brigade, I was very impressed when I pondered our Uncle's statement that "our resistance is that of the entire people. That is why we have to mobilize and arm the entire people." Since then, while embarking on the specific task of building the Armed Forces, I have become more aware of the people's role in a liberation war as pointed out by our Uncle. Liberation war is quite different from all ancient and conventional wars and is more sophisticated than all the wars for national salvation conducted by our forefathers in history. It is no longer a conventional war between two armies as it drives the enemy into fighting not only with our army but also with our people. History shows that no invading army can defeat a nation when the nation has been closely united and guided by a correct line.

The eight words "mobilize the entire people, arm the entire people" imply almost everything, from ideological to organizational viewpoints in the practical conduct of the people's war strategy. I think that they are the core of a genuine people's war and also the secret for achieving victory for the revolutionary war in our country.

When charting the line for people's war, our Uncle was well aware of the need to conduct a guerrilla war and to care for the building of the guerrilla-militia force.

I remember that Engels himself said: "If a nation wants to regain its independence, it should not confine itself within ordinary methods of war. Instead, it should consider mass uprising, revolutionary war, and the ubiquitous presence of guerrilla forces as the only way with which a small nation can defeat a larger nation and a less-strong army can cope with a stronger and better organized army." And Lenin also said: "Guerrilla war is an indispensable form in the period when the mass movement has truly reached the point of uprising."

[Part 2, 14 May 36 p 3]

["Second installment" of a 4-installment article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Some Reflections on Uncle Ho's Military Concepts"]

[Text] While we were preparing for the general uprising, it was not accidental when Uncle Ho said: "In this armed uprising against the French and the

Japanese, we must resort to guerrilla warfare. We will surely win if we know how to wage a guerrilla war." After that, he devoted his time to translating the document "The Secret Provincial Party Committee" and the books "Experience in French Guerrilla Warfare" and "Experience in Chinese Guerrilla Warfare." Uncle Ho then came to the general conclusion that "guerrilla warfare is a method of fighting employed by the oppressed nations against the imperialists." It is not a method of fighting that is applicable to guerrilla units only. From this concept by Uncle Ho, I have come to understand that a guerrilla war is one that is characterized by the partial uprisings of the revolutionary masses to seize fundamental power for the people. In that war, we must mobilize the entire people to fight the enemy right in their localities with every available means and under every available form. Uncle Ho affirmed: "Militia, self-defense, and guerrilla units constitute the force of the entire nation and an invincible force and a steel wall of the Vietnamese fatherland. No matter how fierce the enemies are, they will be dispersed if they face this force or this wall." When the guerrilla war in our country was developed, it created conditions for the conventional war--the war that was fought by various regular army corps--to take shape and develop. Later, by closely coordinating with each other, these two types of war created an invincible strength for conducting the people's war. It can be said that in light of Uncle Ho's leadership, the guerrilla war in our country assumed a great significance in terms of military strategy and played an important role in the execution of our revolutionary strategy. By thinking carefully, we can find that this is the creative and unique feature of the Vietnam people's war in the Ho Chi Minh era.

Since then, I have thought about the responsibility of our General Staff and have realized that our General Staff not only belongs to our Army and conventional war but also belongs to our guerrilla forces and guerrilla war.

Please do not misunderstand this to mean that Uncle Ho paid more attention to guerrilla warfare and less attention to war as fought by regular army corps. If, more than 100 years ago, Marx and Engels brought to light the famous thesis "Arm the working class, arm the revolutionary masses" and, after the success of the Soviet October Revolution, Lenin advocated the "building of a worker-peasant Red Army on the basis of arming the people," our Uncle also pointed out the need to "organize the worker-peasant army" in the "condensed political platform of our party" in 1930, and directly led a movement in preparation for the uprising after his return to the country in 1941.

Together with our party, he advocated the organization of the "Vietnam people's revolutionary army and arming of the masses." Later, he ordered the selection of cadres, party members, and youths for military training abroad. More than 50 of our brothers were selected for overseas training on this occasion. When Uncle Ho ordered the formation of the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army unit in December 1944, he pointed out the strategic role of the main forces in the thesis of arming the entire people: "Militarily, the main principle is the principle of concentrating forces." Therefore, we "will select a number of strong-willed and most ardent cadres and guerrillas from the Cao-Bac-Lang [Cao Bang-Bac Thai-Lang Son] guerrilla units and will use a large quantity of weapons to form a main force unit." To train cadres

in time for the development of forces, Uncle Ho again ordered the establishment of the anti-Japanese politico-military school. I was deeply moved when I was assigned to be in charge of this school, despite the fact that I still could not understand adequately this immense significance.

In his directive on the establishment of the Vietnam Armed Propaganda Brigade, Uncle Ho did not forget to remind us that "while assembling forces to organize our first army, we must maintain the local armed forces, coordinate with them in action, and provide them with assistance in all fields"; and he foresaw its glorious future, saying that "it is the predecessor of the liberation army, and it may march from north to south and throughout our land of Vietnam." The establishment of this brigade was a shining milestone in the history of the people's army; and it has been deeply remembered by the entire party and people and especially, by all of our cadres as Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap once said: "Right from the outset, Uncle Ho envisaged a massive people's army composed of the regular forces, the local forces, and the militia and self-defense forces."

These regular forces gradually developed into the liberation army; and after seizing administrative power on 7 September 1945, our Uncle decided to set up the General Staff. Afterwards, the liberation army was renamed the National Guard Army and then, the People's Army with uniform staff and command systems. Our Uncle always cared for the Army in all respects, and he personally led or directed its major campaigns, giving detailed instructions to cadres....

I recall that back in May 1957, while talking to a refresher course for mid-and high-level cadres of the Defense Ministry and to mid-level classes for cadres of the various general departments, our Uncle said: "As today's technology is constantly developing, we will remain backward unless we try to study hard; and efforts must be made to develop a standardized pattern in every unit." Someone ventured to say: "We fought victoriously before even though we were not standardized at all." Our Uncle replied: "It is not true. The situation is changing with each passing day. Today is not yesterday. Our Army must surely advance step by step toward standardization and modernization."

Based on all of the above mentioned concepts, I have come to realize that the simultaneous conduct of the guerrilla war and the conventional war to bring into play the aggregate strength of the entire people--with the militia and guerrilla forces as well as the main-force troops serving as decisive factors of military might and with the guerrilla war and the conventional war supporting each other and helping each other to develop--was our Uncle's achievement in applying in a very creative manner the Marxist-Leninist military science. As a military cadres of the party educated and trained by Uncle Ho, I feel that I myself must deeply understand this unique creative feature of the Vietnamese people's war in today's era under the guidance of his military concepts.

Next, I would like to present some reflections on the invincible strength of the people's war in light of Uncle Ho's military concepts.

The history of wars in Vietnam over the past 4 decades shows that when confronting Vietnam, the army of any aggressor--no matter how powerful and how rich in war potentials it may be--has invariably sustained ignominious defeat in the face of the people's war strategy.

The key to success in warfare is how to generate the greatest strength and to employ and develop it to defeat all enemy aggressors. In light of our Uncle's revolutionary concepts, the revolutionary war brought into play the people's war strategy, using the latent might of the entire country, and mastered the strength of our times to create an invincible aggregate strength with which to "defeat the two big empires--France and the United States."

From this main feature of Uncle Ho's military concept I understand that the first secret formula to creating the strength of the people's warfare strategy in our country is the successful organizing and mobilizing of all the people to unite and resist; this closely combines political strength with military strength. Obviously, the strength of that all-people resistance bloc must be based on the increasingly steadier worker-peasant alliance and be placed under the party leadership just like Uncle once indicated when he restated the factors ensuring victory: "The worker-peasant alliance must be established because it is the surest guarantee for the victory of the revolution."

The longer I ponder, the more profoundly I have realized that from the time of mobilizing armed uprisings to the years of war, the great political strength of the "all-people's fight" against the enemy not only was the inexhaustible source of reinforcement for the development of the people's armed forces, but also was a force with which to attack the enemy directly. It is clear that the people's war in Vietnam in the light of Uncle Ho's military concept involves closely combining the political struggle with the armed struggle to rise up to fight under many forms of fruitful and flexible combat.

Uncle Ho called on all the people to resist. As he further added that resistance must be comprehensive, I think this was also a secret formula to create strength for the people's war. I still remember clearly that everytime he talked or sent out a letter to call upon the people and combatants to step up resistance and national building, Uncle Ho usually linked "all-people's resistance" with "comprehensive resistance." He urged "each Vietnamese citizen, regardless of ages and sexes, either rich or poor, big or small, should become a fighter on a battlefield: military, economic, political, or cultural." Assessing the significance of comprehensive resistance, he said "Military victories bring about political victories that in turn make military victories even greater."

The diplomatic struggle in our country is mainly a battlefield of strategic significance which is closely coordinated with the military and political battlefronts. It reflects the marvelous ability of our Uncle and party in leading the war. Uncle Ho was primarily a marvelous model in combining all the battlefronts. During the early years of the August Revolution, the country was just like a boat in the middle of a whirlpool. Uncle Ho clear-sightededly divided the enemy, took advantage of the contradictions between France and

Chiang Kaishek to defeat or eliminate the enemies one by one, maintained a temporarily conciliatory attitude toward the Chiang Kaishek clique in the north to reserve all the forces for checking the imperialists in the south, then signed a temporary convention with France to drive the Chiang Kaishek troops and their henchmen out of the country.

Only through such a move, could our people have a period of highly valued time to prepare their forces for the prolonged resistance struggle against the French colonialists. A well-known Western militarist had to say: "In signing the preliminary agreement of 6 March, Mr Ho Chi Minh made the best chess move in the world." Uncle Ho then analyzed: "Nearly a year of temporary peace allowed us to have time to basically build our forces."

Then, during the war, the policy of "fighting while negotiating" was mainly the art of leading the war which has become a tradition aimed at developing the all-people strength to attack the enemy troops.

Uncle Ho considers the enemy proselytizing work "a political task." This is the "destruction of the enemy without having to fight," and also "the way of wearing out enemy vitality."

[Part 3, 15 May 86 p 3]

("Third Installment" of a 4-installment article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Some Reflections on Uncle Ho's Military Concepts")

[Text] On the economic battlefield, Uncle Ho said: "We must protect and develop our economy and economically struggle against the enemy." He called the policy of increasing production and practicing thrift a "basic policy" to improve the people's livelihood, to enable troops "to eat well and fight victoriously," and to get enough equipment for fighting the enemy. As regards agricultural production during resistance, he said: "Ricefields are battlefields, spades and ploughs are weapons, peasants are combatants...." These words are easy to remember and give a very general notion to a form of comprehensive resistance of the people's war.

Speaking of comprehensive resistance, our Uncle paid most attention to the ideological and cultural battlefield. As a matter of fact, the enemy always uses the cruel maneuvers of the very subtle psychological warfare to sabotage us on the ideological and cultural battlefield in order to undermine the combat will of our troops and divide our people. Our Uncle therefore said: "Culture and arts also constitute a battlefield" and specified: "Carrying out the cultural task to train new men and new cadres for the cause of resistance and national construction".... When we think of the two verses:

Now poems should be strongly worded,

Poets must also know how to assault.

Our Uncle composed while in the Kuonington prison, we can realize sufficiently clear that it was at the very moment when he pointed out all-people and

comprehensive resistance he was shaping the military concept of generally reviewing and combining all the strengths of all forces, battlefronts, and fighting methods and forms into an essential and fundamental law of revolutionary war in our country. It has emerged from the revolutionary ideology, developed vividly in revolutionary war, and become very specific in the people's war strategy.

How can one speak of the strength of the people's war strategy and forget to analyze the strength of the regime and home front in the revolutionary war.

This is also a secret formula to create the strength of the people's war strategy which our Uncle emphasized very attentively.

Lenin said: "In war, he who has more reserve forces and more sources of strength, and who persistently stays close to the masses, will win."

Formerly, when discussing national defense plans, our forefathers also mentioned the need to "create bases" and to use "the people's strength to formulate well-contrived plans." Our Uncle further asserted such need when he said "We must build the country while resisting." No sooner had the revolution triumphed and the young democratic republic administration had been beset with difficulties, than our Uncle called on the people to fight famine, illiteracy, and foreign aggression. This was mainly the question of fostering the people's strength and strengthening the latent potentials in preparation for the unavoidable resistance. The land reform policy during resistance reduced rent and interest rates, and allowed solidarity to be firmly maintained while consolidating the worker-peasant alliance, thus intensifying even more strongly the combative impetus.

During the years of resistance against the United States, our Uncle determined the socialist North as the great rear of the great southern frontline. How can we forget those years and the role of the great rear when our Uncle urged that "each person must work twice as much for the southern kith and kin"? What a burning issue of confidence and expectation such an exhortation stirred up for the great frontline then! This simultaneously provided adequate organizational and material strength--manpower and other assets--to a war that was becoming ever larger and fiercer, but the great frontline remained strong enough to defeat all the U.S. war strategies and win a total victory.

I remember that at the Third National Party Congress held in 1960, Uncle Ho said: "A prosperous and strong north is the firm basis for the struggle to reunify the country." At the time, I understood what he said but could not fully visualize the firm basis of that statement. It was not until I was assigned by our Uncle and the Political Bureau to the southern command to directly lead the anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation and after having time and again taken the Truong Son trails did I fully realize the immensity of the strength of the socialist North--the great rear of the great frontline. I find that that statement fully reflects the significance of proletarian military science according to which, "the rear area is a permanent factor that decides the success of war."

Fully understanding our Uncle's military concepts, I feel it all the more necessary for me, even though I am a military cadre, to concern myself not only with fighting the enemy on the frontline but also with building the rear area before, during, and after the war.

Combining the strength of the nation with the strength of our times constitutes an extremely important issue and one of the secret keys to developing the strength of the revolutionary war in light of Uncle Ho's military concepts.

Our Uncle taught us not to rely on others: "A nation that does not strive for its own survival and only waits for help from other nations does not deserve to gain independence." Nevertheless, he pointed out: "We must rely chiefly on our own strength and, at the same time, win the active assistance of fraternal socialist countries and peace- and justice-loving peoples the world over, including the progressive American people." This is the truth.

It can be said that our Uncle manifested the harmonious combination of genuine patriotism with lofty proletarian internationalism in his feelings, determination, and policies. He said: "The Vietnamese revolution is an integral part of the world revolution." He then urged all cadres to "uphold proletarian internationalism, maintain and develop friendship with fraternal socialist countries, wholeheartedly support the liberation movement of nations, unite with the working class and the world peoples in the struggle against U.S.-led imperialism, and struggle for space, national independence, democracy, and socialism." Toward the Lao and Cambodian peoples in particular, our Uncle instructed us to "support them with all our hearts" and pointed out that "helping friendly countries is to help ourselves."

All of our Uncle's instructions were realized during the warring years. We were able to muster the strength of our times and make use of the strength of our nation—which was also the strength of the revolutionary war in our country—to fight the enemy from every direction, including from within the enemy's strongholds.

The more I contemplate this, the more clearly I come to realize that under our Uncle's guidance, each military cadre of the party must be an internationalist combatant who fights well for the nation's survival as well as for internationalist interests. Such a combatant must be sensitive to the international situation and the international background of the struggle for national liberation and, what is more, to the international background of each offensive campaign. In particular, attention must be given to the fact that Indochina is a single battlefield. Our Uncle's statement that "helping friendly countries is to help ourselves" seems to be quite simple, but in practice, it is very profound and very strategic in meaning.

It can be concluded that the extremely great strength of the Vietnamese people's war was the sum of the latent strength of the country and the nation, of political strength combined with military strength, of the strength of the entire people fighting the enemy combined with the strength of the various army corps, of the strength of a rear area that was always made firm and strong by successive mature generations with their deep love for the country and the

system, and of the strength stemming from "the fraternity of proletarians from every corner of the compass." This is revolutionary military science creatively developed by our talented Uncle during the revolutionary war in Vietnam; and it has become an indispensable rule and a truism of our times. As our Uncle once said, "with the favorable conditions of today's revolutionary movement, any nation--small though it may be, but if it can achieve close unity, fights determinedly in accordance with correct political and military lines, and wins the positive support and assistance of the socialist camp and revolutionary peoples in the world--will surely be able to defeat any aggressors, including the imperialist ringleader which is U.S. imperialism."

In continuation, I would like to point out my understanding of the application of our Uncle's military concepts in the development, training, and leadership of the people's army. I think this is a very important subject that all military cadres, irrespective of their different command positions, must deeply study.

First, our Uncle paid the utmost attention to education with the aim of defining the goals that the Army must fight for, namely the fatherland's independence and freedom and the socialist and communist ideals. Our Uncle clearly stated: "Our Army--local to the party, filial to the people, and ready to fight and make sacrifices for the independence and freedom of the fatherland and for socialism--will fulfill any missions, overcome any difficulties, and defeat any enemies."

Thus, it is very obvious that the nature of the VPA was defined by our Uncle as the revolutionary nature of the working class. This nature is reflected in its relationship with the people as clearly pointed out by him. "The people are the foundation and parents of the Armed Forces...." And he added: "We fight the enemy for the people but we are not their 'saviors' because our duty is to serve the people." This nature is also reflected in the Army's internal relations. Our Uncle gave his heart-felt guidance: "A cadre must have affection for his unit members.... He must be their brother, sister, and friend." And he pointed out: "A cadre cannot achieve anything without his unit members, nor can a leader without the masses. Therefore, a cadre must have affection for his unit members. All cadres--from the commander-in-chief down to the squad leaders--must care for the material and spiritual life of unit members.... If the soldiers have not eaten, cadres should not complain about hunger. If the soldiers are inadequately clothed, cadres should not grumble about the cold. If the soldiers are not well rested, cadres should not complain about exhaustion. This is the essence of democracy, unity, and invincibility. "The nature of our Army is reflected in the voluntary and strict observance of discipline as profoundly analyzed by our Uncle: "Our Army is a democratic army, but democracy does not rule out orders. Since every order is issued by the higher echelon only after careful consideration, it must be absolutely honored and resolutely executed by the lower echelon, especially during combat." This nature is also reflected in the constant improvement of combat capability as our Uncle said dialectically: "The point is that man's spirit must be imparted to his weapons; and this is to say that we must have good technology." And he ordered: "Our Army must advance toward standardization and modernization." Overriding this nature of our

Army is the determination to fight and win which our Uncle always took care to forge. He awarded determined-to-fight-and-win banners to units that had fulfilled their missions outstandingly. The determination to fight and win must be forged first of all through the inculcation of love for the country, bravery, and readiness to fight and make sacrifices for the fatherland. Our Uncle said: "We are ready to die for the survival of the fatherland. This is the essence of quality, of the determination to fight and win, and of the ability to do so.

[Part 4, 16 May 86 pp 3, 4]

[Fourth and Final Installment of article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Some Reflections on Uncle Ho's Military Concepts"]

[Text] To implement these tasks, there had to be a contingent of good and talented cadres. Our Uncle therefore paid the utmost attention to training cadres from the very beginning of the resistance days. As he wanted comprehensively educated cadres, he used to urge "a general must be intelligent, courageous, humane, credible, honest, and loyal." During my life of combat for national salvation, the first time I heard our Uncle say these words was at the fifth military conference in August 1948, and I felt very excited. He explained "Intelligence is required to see everything clearly and to assess the enemy correctly," "credibility is to win the people's confidence. For example, promises of reward must be kept. Credibility can also mean self-confidence, but is not self-complacency and haughtiness." As for the word courage, I was most convinced when he indicated "boldness to do worthy tasks and daring to fight good battles." He explained humanity very concisely and generally "as sympathy for subordinates and sharing weal and woe with them and as leniency to surrendering enemy soldiers." Of honesty, he said "do not covet wealth, lust, and fame." Particularly, as regards the word loyalty, people of our age often heard the four words "loyal and patriotic troops." Although we understood the sacred meaning of these words, we gave them some miraculous and supernatural sense.

however, when our Uncle said "loyalty to the country and people is a sacred duty and a heavy responsibility but also an honor for the combatants in the first national army of our country" and when he wrote in his letter to the Tran Quoc Tuan school in May 1948, "Now I am pleased to confer the six words 'loyalty to the country and people' on the school." I came to realize that this sacred meaning was stirred up in the hearts of all people, because patriotism and love of the people was becoming the heartfelt feeling of all revolutionary combatants who carried weapons to save the country at that time. When he elaborated "loyalty means absolute loyalty to the country, people, revolution, and party" I understood the more profoundly what he often said of the revolutionary ethics "of struggling resolutely one's whole life for the party and revolution." This encompasses a very broad and profound question concerning the party and country. Loyalty to the party is mainly loyalty to the country. Since the founding of the party, it has been obvious that communists are the most patriotic, because all Vietnamese Communists have been

imbued with our Uncle's famous remark in 1921 "To save the country and liberate the nation, there is no other path than the path of proletarian revolution."

Dealing with the requirements of military cadre training, he paid attention to both general and specific requirements of each branch. He carefully advised the political cadres: "Political commissars must be cordial and affectionate to soldiers as sisters, just as brothers, and understanding as friends." Talking with the rear service cadres, he said: "You must perform in such a way that each bowl of rice, each coin, each cartridge, each tablet of medicine, and each inch of cloth can reach combatants directly." He taught cadres and drivers "to love their trucks like their children and to save gasoline like drops of blood" because "an army without trucks cannot fight great battles." Analyzing the significance of the engineer force, our Uncle compared "assault as the head of a spear and the engineer force as the shaft of the spear." With respect to the sapper force, our Uncle directed "the sapper force is an armed service of the VPA" because "sapper force is a force performing special tasks and a special honor. It must exert special effort."

Our Uncle's teachings and guidance for troop education and development can be said to be very comprehensive, specific, and profound. They reflect the vast learning of a great military commander-in-chief and the thoughtfulness of a very beloved father.

One of the very important and extremely fruitful contents of our Uncle's military concepts is the art of organizing leadership and command.

He was always interested in the problem of organizing military command and building staff agencies. His instructions on the staff agencies' 1945 duties "to know the enemy and ourselves well, build strong troops, forge and train good soldiers, formulate skillful projects and plans, and organize command well" remain always the principles to be observed by staff officers in performing their duties. Then, he scientifically pointed out the task of turning correct policies into real victories, saying that "resolution is 1, planning is 2, but action must be 10." These realities have been reviewed and generalized into theory, principle, and law. It is important not only to the military fields but also a general lesson on the whole art of revolutionary leadership. In the military field, it was particularly important and realistic because it involves the blood and bones of troops, the people's life and the survival of the country when the nation was facing a big, strong, cruel, and cunning enemy. He clearly points out the essential significance of party leadership over the Army and war. The party set the political and military lines and the policies of the people's war and army. The party decided the preparations for and the conduct of the war for national salvation. It declared and concluded the war and was responsible to the nation and the world. The party decided the political, ideological, and organizational guidelines, and military arts, and secured all the material and no conditions for troops.

According to our Uncle's military concepts, the party's historic mission is to lead the Army and war when a war is to be waged. At the same time, our Army must be completely loyal to the party which means loyal to the country and people. Our troops and people can win victory only when fighting under the party banner....

There are many questions, but I want to deal mainly with one aspect of the offensive strategy concept. This can be said to be an overall and dominant issue that prevails the whole leadership and command arts of our Uncle.

In a poem on learning how to play chess, our Uncle asserted:

It is imperative to view broadly and think carefully,
To be resolutely and constantly in the offensive position.

I think that this offensive position originated from his very own and unique trip to the West, to the country of the aggressors themselves, in order to seek to understand them, and to study them before he could return to the country to organize and lead the people in the struggle to resist and drive the aggressors out of the country and regain independence and freedom. Was that a marvelous sage on our planet? Although it was a true story nearly in this century, it still sounds like a myth.

This offensive concept was manifested even in the brief 1930 political program in which he indicated "life comes with the revolution, and without revolution there will be death." From the decision to stage a violent revolution to the resolution of waging a protracted resistance "to rather sacrifice everything than losing the country and be enslaved" constituted a continuous course of offensive. It was all the more obvious that during the eight years of anti-French resistance, in compliance with our Uncle Ho's teachings "our people and troops had strenuously strived to constantly attack the enemy," we "never stopped our offensive" on either large or small scale. Our guerrilla warfare was developed into conventional war, creating surprise attacks in each campaign and on each battlefield. Most typical was the strategic offensive in the winter-spring season of 1953-54, during which he overran the whole group of huge enemy strongholds in Dien Bien Phu. During those months and days, our Uncle was right to observe: "Our forces become stronger with every passing day. They are just like a new gushing stream and a freshly stoked fire. To them, there is only advance and no retreat."

I find that this concept of offensive strategy is clearly reflected in our Uncle's and our party's very creative guidance over the revolution and the revolutionary war. In particular, about creating opportunities, building positions, making use of the time factor, seizing opportunities, and taking the initiative, our Uncle said: "Taking the initiative is actually meant to maintain the offensive position. We can only fight the enemy by maintaining an offensive position. In a poem entitled "Learn to Play Chess," he wrote:

Losing the initiative, both knights will become worthless,
When opportunity strikes, a single pawn will achieve victory.

These instructions by our Uncle are extremely important to everyone of our military cadres. For it is obvious that only an offensive position will enable us to take the initiative and seize the opportunity. An offensive position can only be developed by taking the initiative and seizing the opportunity. After having spent years working directly with the staff organ to prepare for the General Command to launch the border, northwest, Hoa Binh, Dien Bien Phu, and other campaigns, I came to realize even more clearly that the art of creating giant leaps in warfare originates from the concept of offensive strategy developed by our Uncle and our party.

Most particularly, the art of creating opportunities, firmly grasping the opportunities, taking the initiative in making bold attacks, and making use of the surprise factor always remains the main condition for all successes.

Imbued with our Uncle's instructions, I find that only an offensive concept will lead to offensive actions. Taking offensive actions is the main method for seizing the initiative which is the highest manifestation of the concept of offensive strategy.

Talking about seizing the initiative, I recall our Uncle's visit to a conference of cadres held by the General Command in preparation for the northwest campaign in 1952. Unfortunately, it rained on that day; and the current in the Luc Gia spring was rising and flowing very swiftly. Nevertheless, our Uncle came exactly at 0900 as scheduled.

He asked:

--You all have studied your tasks but do you understand them thoroughly?

We replied in unison:

--Yes, Uncle, we do.

--Are you determined?

--Yes, we are.

--Now that you all are determined, you will have to carry out your tasks at all costs. If determination is worth 1, planning will be worth twice as much as methods, 10 times as much in order to seize the initiative. Do you understand what I mean?

Brother Vuong Thua Vu rose and expressed, on behalf of the conference, his understanding of our Uncle's instruction. Our Uncle showed his pleasure and recounted his crossing of the Luc Gia spring as an example. Knowing in advance that the water was rising and flowing swiftly, making it hazardous to swim across the spring, he had prepared to come to the conference on time. As his bodyguards were still at a loss, without knowing what to do, he produced a length of rope and said: "One of you swim across first and tie one end of this rope to that tree on the other bank of the spring so that the rest of us can swim across safely."

Our Uncle told us:

--"In the military field, it is all the more necessary to foresee the situation in advance and make preparations accordingly to seize the initiative. We must always take the initiative firmly. We will be able to seize the initiative if we foresee the situation and make preparations in advance.

The example given by our Uncle was quite simple, but it was very meaningful and unforgettable.

It was thanks to the concept of offensive strategy that while the enemy was dragging its guillotine about to kill patriots and destroying revolutionary bases, we were still determined to stage a concerted uprising and succeed in seizing control over many large areas.

When the U.S. aggressors brought in 200,000 soldiers, we attacked them and scored resounding armed exploits at Van Tuong, Nui Thanh, Plei Me, Bau Bang, and so on. When the U.S. troops strength was increased to 500,000, we continued to attack (the 1968 Tet Mau Than offensive), forcing the United States to de-escalate the war, admit its defeat in the local war, and sit at the negotiating table.

About setting up positions, our Uncle explained graphically: "If well placed, a weight of 1 kg can multiply its force and raise an object weighing hundreds of kilograms." And he pointed out: "In fighting the United States, we can use the few to defeat the many thanks to our very favorable position. It is obvious that we will win and the enemy will lose."

During the last years of the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation, the concept of offensive strategy was reflected even more markedly in the political, military, and diplomatic fields. Perhaps no one can ever forget the lesson of 1973: In localities where we were naive about national reconciliation and mistakenly thought we could reconcile with the enemy, the latter would immediately seize control over the population and the lands. But those localities that "incessantly maintained the offensive position" were able not only to hold on to the lands and the population but also to further enlarge the liberated area.

In 1975, the projected 2 years needed for the liberation of the South was reduced to 1 year. This time projection was again shortened to the end of the rainy season; and eventually, it was decided that total victory must be won to end the war before the coming of the rainy season. This reflected the art of creating positions and seizing big opportunities that arose from the position of revolutionary offensive. The leading comrades who succeed our Uncle, together with the Political Bureau and the party Central Committee, led the entire party, people, and Army in completing the cause of national liberation, thus making our Uncle's wish come true.

About the application of the concept of offensive strategy to the guidance of combat operations, our Uncle pointed out in a fairly specific manner the relationship between attack and defense. He told us: "There are times when

we are forced by the situation to be on the defensive. But our way of defense is offensive defense, meaning that we attack the enemy to strengthen our defense instead of pulling back and staying in one place for the enemy to strike at will."

I understand that the concept of offensive strategy developed by our Uncle served as the basic guideline for actions. This was why he wrote:

Attack, retreat, and put up a defense as swift as lightning,
And make all offensive and defensive actions foolproof.
This will make a general deserve to be a hero.

Our Uncle meant that under specific circumstances, we must act in a very flexible manner.

For instance, the Route 9 campaign in southern Laos was, in my opinion, a counteroffensive campaign that had been positively prepared from a general position of strategic offensive; and therefore, we were able to score a big success in breaking the backbone of the U.S. imperialists' Vietnamization strategy. And during this strong counteroffensive campaign that was conducted from an offensive position, we set up clusters of campaign points of a firm defensive character that combined mobile combat maneuvers with blocking tactics to create a battleground nearly comparable to a prearranged one, thus ensuring success for the counteroffensive campaign.

In retrospect, following the Tet Mau Than Offensive, had we applied our Uncle's military concept of "making all offensive and defense actions foolproof," the impact of our victory would surely have been far more resounding and greatly multiplied during the ensuing winter-spring campaigns. For our main forces would have remained intact, and in particular, the local revolutionary forces would surely have been able to hold on to their battle stations in order to develop the offensive stance.

However, the U.S.-puppets made a mistake. In 1970, they staged a coup in Cambodia and sent their troops to that country. This was a favorable opportunity for the Cambodian revolution. We quickly helped our friends open liberated areas, thus creating a situation in which the whole of Indochina was a battlefield and Indochina was on the revolutionary offensive.

...Thanks to our Uncle's instructions, for more than 40 years' fighting against the enemy for national salvation under the party's leadership, I always held in my heart "the determination to be constantly on the offensive."

...I have not yet had the opportunity to write fully and in detail about our Uncle's military concepts. Nevertheless, now is obviously the time for us to study more deeply and more carefully and to review more comprehensively the fundamental revolutionary lines charted by Uncle Ho, his flexible application of the Marxist-Leninist military science to the specific conditions of Vietnam, and the inheritance and development of the nation's tradition of fighting the enemy for national salvation which our Uncle held in very high regard.

I feel that the revolutionary and scientific concepts about building the people's armed forces and the people's army taught by Uncle Ho have now perhaps become part of myself.

It seems that these concepts have become as simple as other truisms that I have come to understand well. I think this is possible owing to the extremely persistent teaching efforts made by our Uncle during the years when the entire people were fighting the enemy. His teachings have been translated into universal truth during our nation's struggle against the enemy for national defense over the past nearly half a century, and they are still guiding us today.

But I think that these concepts form a whole system of profound and broad knowledge about the theoretical and practical aspects of the science of generating strength for directing our nation's war for national salvation, and they should be contemplated on a lifelong basis.

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CSO: 4209/580

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID

VIETNAM

NHAN DAN URGES THAI RESPECT FOR LAO SOVEREIGNTY

OW071700 Hanoi VNA in English 1507 GMT 7 Jun 86

[Text] Hanoi, VNA 7 Jun--The Thai authorities should not forget the lesson of their occupation of three hamlets in Sayaboury Province of Laos two years ago, NHAN DAN [words indistinct].

The paper recalls that not long after China launched a large-scale land-nibbling attack along the Vietnamese northern border, Thai troops in June 1984 seized by force three hamlets of Laos. However, Bangkok together with Beijing, its supporter, received a heavy rebuff and had to withdraw from those hamlets." [quotation marks as received]

The paper goes [words indistinct].

"But [word indistinct] they declared to withdraw the Thai authorities urged that Laos take responsibility for the losses and prevented Lao citizens forcibly taken to Thailand from returning to their native places. Until now, Thailand persists in its scheme of turning those hamlets into a 'contested area' in order to demand reconsideration of the whole Thai-Lao border."

"The Thai ultra-rights [word indistinct] by Beijing has turned down Laos's proposal to resume the negotiation on the issue and continued with their acts of provocation against the Lao People's Democratic Republic, including air intrusions, artillery shellings of populated areas, intrusions into Lao territorial waters and attacks on islets in the Mekong River. They also continue to provide support for Lao reactionaries in exile in Thailand in their activities against the Lao Government."

"The Vietnamese government and people have consistently supported the well-meaning stance of the Lao Government and people. They demand that the Thai authorities strictly respect Laos' sovereignty over the three said hamlets," the paper says in conclusion.

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CSO: 4200/1115

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID

VIETNAM

BRIEFS

THANKS FROM AL-QADHDHAFI--Hanoi, VNA 6 Jun--Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the September 1 revolution of the socialist people's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah, has thanked the Vietnamese women for their strong support to and militant solidarity with the people and women of Libya in their struggle against U.S. aggression. The Libyan leader's feeling is expressed in a letter conveyed to the Central Committee of the Vietnam Women's Union today by the secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau in Hanoi. In his letter, Col. al-Qadhdhafi stressed that supporting Libya, the Vietnamese women have endorsed the common struggle for peace and freedom of all nations. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1505 GMT 6 Jun 86 OW] /7358

SOVIET GIFTS GIVEN TO CHILDREN--On the afternoon of 7 June, a ceremony was held in Hanoi to receive gifts from Comrade Vorotnikov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The gifts include cars, amplifiers, and theatrical costumes which were handed over to the Hanoi Children Palace by Comrade Milov, vice minister of culture of the USSR and Comrade Vorotnikov's special envoy who recently came to Vietnam for a visit. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0500 GMT 7 Jan 86 UK] /9274

CSO: 4209/580

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French, Spring 86 pp 233-239

[Interview with Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Minister Nguyen Co Thach by Francois Joyaux, professor at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (University of Paris III), member of the Foundation for National Defense Studies and author, among other published works, of: "China and the Settlement of Indochina's First Conflict--Geneva 1954, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1979; "The Foreign Policy of People's China", PUF, 1983; "The New Far East Question", Payot, 1985; in Hanoi, time not given]

[Text] Francois Joyaux: Mr Minister, the international press has interpreted the transfer of Mr Kapitsa, the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, as a repudiation of the statements in which he envisaged the completion of the evacuation of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1987. The Vietnamese government itself officially envisages such an exodus for 1990. Can it be deduced from this that there is disagreement between the USSR and Vietnam concerning the process for settling the Cambodian problem?

Nguyen Co Thach: Our position on the Indochinese problem has always been supported by the Soviet Union. So let's leave aside the erroneous interpretations by the press! In this affair the USSR is in complete agreement with the resolutions of the 10th and 11th conferences of the States of Indochina. As far as the date of 1987 is concerned, I can tell you this: we have decided on a unilateral withdrawal for 1990 at the latest. But if the two parties manage to come together sooner, of course the time period can be shortened.

Francois Joyaux: Aside from this question of dates, what is your view of the process for political settlement of the Cambodian affair?

Nguyen Co Thach: The Cambodian question basically has two facets, one international and the other domestic.

Domestically, things must be discussed and settled between Cambodians. The Vietnamese can't substitute for them any more than others can, to decide and negotiate. It is necessary to be very clear on that point.

At the international level, all of the interested parties--meaning Cambodians, Indochinese countries, China and the other states concerned--must arrive at an understanding.

But besides these two areas, the problem also assumes a regional dimension: the neutralization of Southeast Asia. At present there reigns in that region an atmosphere of defiance between the interested parties. Also, confidence must be restored first, before there can be any hope of arriving at a solution. I say this completely objectively. In fact, who can legitimately be on guard today? We can, the Indochinese; and not the ASEAN countries (Footnote 1) (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei)

At the moment, Indonesia would like to create a kind of strategic equilibrium between the three large countries present in the area: China, the USSR and the United States. According to the Indonesians, once this equilibrium is reached, it would be easier to settle the problems. We are interested in these ideas. But, in our opinion, the plan for a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality", or De Gaulle's old idea relative to the neutralization of Southeast Asia, are much more likely to favor such a settlement. Moreover, I believe the time has come for France to relaunch this idea. It is not old-fashioned, from it. A neutralization of all of Southeast Asia would create the suitable framework for an easy solution to the problem of Cambodia. It is advisable, therefore, that both parties accept not only Cambodia's neutralization, but also that of the entire region. Of course, we must keep in mind the fact that there will be difficulties, for example on the American side. Nevertheless, it is possible to end up at a status quo on such points as the presence of American bases in Southeast Asia and the movement of Soviet ships.

Francois Joyaux: For you, then, the question of the neutralization of Southeast Asia has priority over the neutralization of Cambodia?

Nguyen Co Thach: That is in fact the goal to be attained because, I say again, it is a matter of an indispensable framework. Admitting this does not mean that one accepts de facto the present situation in Cambodia; but simply that the Cambodian problem represents the last question to be resolved within the framework of neutralization. I think such a step would facilitate things. But if a preliminary settlement of the Cambodian question were to be required before any discussion on neutralization, we would also accept that; but it would be more difficult.

If the United States allies itself with China, if the ASEAN countries oppose us, how can we have any confidence?

As far as Cambodia is concerned, one primary principle has already been obtained: the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops. But the Chinese are not agreeing, in return, to interrupt their aid to Pol Pot's forces! Moreover, the problem of the sanctuaries in Thailand arises. If things continue the way they are, how can the problem of Cambodia be resolved?

A second principle has also been ratified: Cambodia's noncommitment and independence.

The questions now in abeyance, therefore, have to do with control over the withdrawal of Pol Pot's forces; China's support; the Thailand sanctuaries; the modalities for withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. These are questions of an international nature.

As for domestic problems, as I told you, it is up to the Cambodians to resolve them, in complete sovereignty. It's not up to us, it's not up to France, it's not up to China, nor to the Soviet Union nor to the United States. Look at the conferences in Geneva in 1954 and in Paris in 1973; it was always left to the countries themselves to be concerned with settling their domestic problems. This is clear where Vietnam is concerned. First the international question was settled, and then the organizing of the South Vietnam government was left to the parties in conflict. In Korea, it was the same thing. A problem can be frozen: you put out the fire and then you leave it to the people of the country to be responsible for settling the domestic dispute.

To sum up, I will say that there are several possibilities. The first is the preliminary neutralization of Southeast Asia and later the settlement of the Cambodian affair. The second is the reverse option: preliminary settlement in Cambodia and then neutralization. The third consists of conducting both operations simultaneously. Proof of imagination is required in order to untangle this affair.

Francois Joyaux: Is it your impression that a fairly broad agreement on the objectives, but that the problems that persist have to do with hardly anything but diplomatic technique?

Nguyen Co Thach: No, it isn't just a matter of diplomatic technique. I say again, it is basically a problem of confidence. On our side, we are not sure that if we withdraw our troops, the other party will cease its activities. Up to now, it is our impression that China is persisting in pushing Pol Pot's partisans toward the government.

Francois Joyaux: The Chinese seem to have modified their foreign policy somewhat: detente with the USSR, a rather clear distinction between the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and the Soviet presence in Vietnam, etc. Of course, we still observe military difficulties on the border, but in all, the situation seems less tense than it was 3 years ago.

Nguyen Co Thach: You're right. However, when you want to study the foreign policy of the Chinese, you don't have to observe what they are doing and what they are saying, but what they are not doing and what they are not saying. It's like magicians.

Francois Joyaux: Do you mean that one should not let oneself be impressed by the show, but should also look behind the scenes?

Nguyen Co Thach: For example, it is necessary to see that in 1985 there was no second "lesson" as promised by the Chinese. This is important. It wasn't that they had mercy on the Vietnamese! It was merely that they had mercy on the "Four Modernizations", and China's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. They also thought that if they carried out their threat, people would end up wondering, with regard to those "lessons", who are the pupils and who are the teachers. What's more, such an initiative might have reassured some people, but also might have thrown many others in Southeast Asia into a panic.

Naturally, if relations between China and the Soviet Union are improved, it is because Peking let the "three obstacles" formerly obstructing any rapprochement

take a back seat. (Footnote 2)(The "three obstacles" the Chinese want removed to allow a genuine normalization of Sino-Soviet relations are involve reducing the military tension at the border between the two countries, withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan and stopping Soviet aid to the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops.) But these three obstacles are still being emphasized, as a matter of form. Between China and the United States, the Formosa question is the biggest obstacle. That question directly affects Chinese national interests, and yet China has disregarded it in order to improve its relations with Washington. It has acted differently where Cambodia is concerned. You see, what it is not doing is more important than what it is conspicuously doing.

Francois Joyaux: Do you think the Indochina question can be resolved without the Americans being involved, directly or indirectly, in a possible settlement?

Nguyen Co Thach: In my opinion, they are not indispensable. They can contribute to the search for a solution, but it is also possible to succeed without them. As you well know, only the absent are wrong!

Francois Joyaux: Do you mean that settlement is in danger of being accomplished at their expense?

Nguyen Co Thach: No, but you can certainly see that pursuing confrontation in Southeast Asia goes against their allies' interests. Look at the affair of the Philippines. And there, we are not involved!

Francois Joyaux: To put it plainly, to you, the settlement of the Indochina question is not linked to a reintegration of the United States into the diplomatic process?

Nguyen Co Thach: We acquired our independence against the United States. We would have liked to obtain it in accord with them, but that wasn't possible; so we won it against them. That's history. I'm not going to teach you history, you who are a historian!

Francois Joyaux: Several years ago, it was common knowledge that Vietnam was interested in an opening toward the United States. Is that still true today?

Nguyen Co Thach: Yes, we continue to hold the door open. We are ready to normalize our relations with Washington.

Francois Joyaux: You're even maintaining their future embassy!

Nguyen Co Thach: Have you seen it?

Francois Joyaux: No, I haven't visited it.

Nguyen Co Thach: You must go and see it. It isn't as large, though, as the French House. You know, relations with the United States do not constitute our reason for living. But it is aggravating to always have enemies. Especially the Great Powers.

Francois Joyaux: If things moved toward the peaceful coexistence you hope for with China, the United States and Southeast Asia, what would become of your relations with the USSR? You know how Western public opinion doesn't understand very well that a country which has fought for decades for its independence can then give away bases or, if you prefer, military facilities, to the USSR.

Nguyen Co Thach: Careful, the difference that exists between "base" and "facility" is what distinguishes Subic Bay from Cam Ranh!

Francois Joyaux: If a certain normalization occurred in Indochina, would the Soviet military implantation in Vietnam be changed?

Nguyen Co Thach: I believe that to impose conditions on us, such as changing our relations with a third country, as the price of normalization, would be asking too much of us. The requirements of our defense may force us to give facilities away to the Soviets. On the other hand, if those requirements are disappearing, why hold onto to advantages like those? For example, during the war against the United States, the situation was much more dangerous for us and yet we refused help from Chinese and Soviet volunteers. The war against the United States, if there is any lesson to be learned from it, showed how jealous we are of our independence.

Francois Joyaux: Mr Minister, can we bring this overview to an end with a question about your feelings with respect to Vietnamese-French relations?

Nguyen Co Thach: You know, even though I was a prisoner of the French for 5 years, from 1940 to 1945, I have retained a friendship for your people.

Francois Joyaux: Many Frenchmen were prisoners of the Vietnamese and also kept some friendship for them.

Nguyen Co Thach: What I mean is that for historical reasons--good or bad--we would like to maintain friendly relations with France. The past is forgotten. Moreover, it had its good points. However, up to now it is my impression that between France and Vietnam there still exist "Chinese shadows". Look at that affair of the loan. (Footnote 3) (This is a loan from France to Vietnam whose principle was agreed upon several years ago, but which has never been released by the French Treasury because of financial litigation.) It isn't much, but it is proof. Mrs Thatcher has agreed to reschedule the Vietnamese debt. And France hasn't released its loan.

Francois Joyaux: Is Vietnam still interested in the Francophones?

Nguyen Co Thach: Of course. Many of them speak French. But if French-speaking remains an empty vehicle, it won't last long. A vehicle is of interest only if it has a load to transport.

I would like to also stress the fact that France can help us in other ways: for example, by supporting neutralization of Southeast Asia. Why wouldn't France now do something with Indonesia to relaunch that idea? This would be an important contribution to peace in the whole of Southeast Asia.

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PARTI ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

IMPROVED GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY URGED

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 1 Jan 86 pp 1, 6, 7

[Article by Thai Duy: "New Year's Hope"]

[Text] The New Year's interview question was short and to the point: "What are the prospects for 1986?"

I requested a friend who had been active for years in Front work, from the time of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, to introduce me to a number of typical representatives of the various strata of people so that I could interview them. He handed me a newly printed book the contents of which included the resolution on "Civilian proselytizing and opinions by leadership on the good points and deficiencies in the mass proselytizing work during the recent period." He said:

"The prospects depend first of all on that matter. It is very essential that we return to the source and truly make the people the roots, otherwise we will have to pay a very high price."

I read the thin volume and understood more fully an increasingly greater peril, the source of all mistakes and losses, which, unintentionally or intentionally, we have not entered into deeply to find specific measures for overcoming and preventing: we are too remote from the people, including the mass organizations that have been "governmentalized." Even the population organizations have not yet escaped from the role of being ornamental plants. Even some National Assembly delegates who make all sorts of promises when they are campaigning for election, but then disappear after they are elected, and at best are present during the National Assembly sessions.

My friend suggested that I go to a subprecinct, where all categories of people, not just the dishonest merchants, speculators, and hoarders, spend money extravagantly. Even some state cadres live lives of kings side-by-side with legitimate workers who live very difficult lives.

I went to Subprecinct 6, Tan Binh Precinct, where 90 percent of the people are Catholic immigrants. Subward 6 has achieved outstanding accomplishments with

regard to its military obligation and is concerned with the people's employment. I asked the subprecinct chairman why the leaders had been successful. He replied:

"We only promise what we can deliver, along with the people, and do our best to avoid saying much but doing little. The people evaluate us in terms of the actual benefits we bring about for them, even if they are very small benefits. Apparently, at the upper echelons a considerable number of cadres often say much or promise much. After they speak their words fly away, while at the basic level words and deeds do not match, so the people evaluate and comment immediately. The head of the municipal propaganda-training department, who visited my subprecinct just after returning from studying in the Soviet Union. He said that at present the ideological work is not a matter of talking much but of doing what we say. He wanted to learn about the way we do things in my subprecinct, where acts and deeds go together."

When I went to another subprecinct the subprecinct secretary told me some stories about some things that had happened in the subprecinct which were relevant to the matter of "words and acts going together." As had the chairman of Subprecinct 6, he had grown up in the Saigon temporary occupation area. His family was part of the Party infrastructure. He entered the party at the end of 1975, when he was only 18. He half wanted to respond and half didn't want to. After a good deal of hesitation he said.

"You say that this story will be published in the newspaper's New Year's edition. I'm afraid that might cause me trouble. If I tell the truth I'm afraid you won't print it, but refrain from telling the truth in order to get the article published. Once a reporter wrote an article about my subprecinct which only dealt with the good things. The people criticized us for years, saying that the subprecinct leadership had mesmerized the reporter."

I tried to win him over and promised that all of his New Year's remarks would be published. At first he was still disorganized, but gradually became more comfortable and self-confident:

"In the subprecinct, an increasingly evident contradiction is easily seen: the workers, including white-collar workers, have difficult working conditions, and some families are no longer able to afford two meals, while people who earn their livings illegally, including a number of cadres and state personnel, are continuing to grow rich. We leadership cadres often say that production is the root and that failure to develop production will adversely affect all other aspects of other work, and that in order to develop production it is necessary to rely on the industrial, white-collar, and manual workers. Why do workers have to suffer such losses, even because of the specific policies or in relations between upper-echelon and lower-echelon organs. I have taken you to visit some installations producing export goods. You saw with your own eyes that the pay rate is very low and that workers who work very hard 8 hours are lucky to earn enough to live. They have a minimum living standard, but when there is a loss of electricity or a shortage of raw materials and they have no work, they must immediately change over to some other means of making a living. If the people receiving the products are a little honest, that is good, but some of them like to be difficult. The goods

meet quality standards but they still criticize them and deliberately nitpick, so they must be bribed. Even when one goes to obtain raw materials at the warehouse one must also pay a bribe. That, of course, adversely affects the workers' incomes. The production installations are late in sending money to the bank they are punished, but when the bank fails to allow the production installations to withdraw money when they need it, it is not punished. Sometimes when one goes to the bank to withdraw money one must pay a bribe. An organ signed a proper contract with the people's production installation in the subprecinct but suddenly stopped accepting its products, blaming various objective difficulties, and allowed the production installation to suffer losses. Recently it was necessary to set up a joint group consisting of a number of cadres to fulfill the mission of monitoring and overseeing the implementation of contracts between the upper-echelon organs and the production installations, in order to prevent acts which sabotage contracts. That alone is enough, but there is also another intermediate phase which the production bases more or less have to bear. Our state apparatus includes many entirely unnecessary intermediate organs. The products that are produced could be taken directly to places needing them, but they must pass through several intermediate organs, and it is necessary to cater to them. Each intermediate organ has hundreds of cadres and personnel. They sweat very little but their incomes are much greater than those of the workers. It may be said that they exploit the sweat and tears of the workers. I'll tell you about something that just happened in my precinct. There was a man in a leadership capacity at a corporation who always traveled by automobile. His organ was famous for being an intermediary. Many production installations had requested permission to operate under the control of his organ but had not received permission to do so. Some workers who lived near him knew that he did nothing beneficial for production but lived ostentatiously and sat in the shade eating from a golden bowl. They intentionally said in a loud voice so that he could hear, "One reason why don't have enough to eat is because of such people." The official recognized one of the workers as being an electronic machinery maintenance man at an enterprise. He went to meet with the subprecinct chairman and said, "The person who said that may be a lackey of the enemy, so we must be on guard." I believe that the chairman's response was entirely correct:

"I'm certain that he's not a bad element or an enemy lackey. People cannot endure the negative acts of our cadres and must speak out." If you are not among those whom the people complain about then you nothing to worry about."

"He became angry but then he had to retreat because he knew that if he made a big deal of it and brought the matter before a neighborhood meeting he could not endure the people's criticism."

"Recently the lunches of many workers were eliminated and, it is said, were included in the new salaries, but prices have risen suddenly and the workers don't have enough money to pay for their own lunches. From the point of view of a subprecinct cadre I can see the workers continuing to be harmed, so in response to your question I am not very optimistic about 1986."

Having returned to the grass roots on the occasion of the new year. I understood the meaning of a cadre who had many years of experience in Front

work: "We must be truly concerned with the people and do everything on the basis of benefit to workers. All policies must be thoroughly studied and researched. We must rely on and have confidence in the people. After the recent money exchange, it is clear that the workers, both manual and white-collar, at the basic level are very poor. It is said that in Minh Hai, a province which is famous for being a rice basket and a source of shrimp and fish, more than 20,000 families had no money to exchange."

"For along time now we have made excuses and acted contrary to the legitimate aspirations of the people, but also have often opposed the system of following the masses. That is a very familiar excuse that has been around for a long time we deliberately reject the correct opinions of the masses and 'do not follow the masses.' When analyzing the reasons for prolonging for several decades the bureaucratic-subsidizing system and for renovating the old system too slowly, we have admitted that there has been failure to listen attentively to the people, cadres, and party members at the basic level. Anyone who disagreed with the way of doing things of the upper echelon giving orders to the lower echelon was mistaken, backward, or even a 'troublemaker.' Waiting for orders from above is still a hard-to-break habit on the part of some organs. Let's talk about prices. The extremely harmful consequences caused over a period of many years because of extremely irrational prices, of the sellers and buyers not being able to determine the prices, are continuing to occur. Workers in the cultivation and animal husbandry sectors, and those working in handicraft trades, lead very unpredictable, anxious lives, and do not know when the upper echelon will come out with a new policy or decision which may cause them to have to 'close up shop,' such as in 1985, when they policies regarding them were changed several times."

The more negativism develops the more there is a tendency not to want to speak of negative matters. When cadres accompany leaders to the localities they take the undesirable initiative of daring suggest to the local cadres that they not tell unhappy stories, which might upset the leaders. Thus the leaders cannot grasp the complicated situation at the lower echelon, the good and the bad still obscure each other, they cannot fully understand the hardships the masses still must bear and has not directly come to grips with the losses caused by degenerate cadres, so it is difficult to decide upon policies that are appropriate to the actual situation at the basic level. At the basic level, why is the managerial apparatus at the village level frightfully large? In addition to the village organizations, which number more than 10, there must be at least 100 governmental, party, and mass organization, stores, stations, farms, etc., directly under the vertical and horizontal sectors. The people still say that every year the preliminary recapitulations, recapitulations, congresses, receptions, celebration feasts, and parties cause a sort of continuous "lost harvest."

The apparatus at the village level is already cumbersome, and the higher the echelon the more it blossoms, swells out, becomes duplicative, and has a high degree of democratic centralism. As several Party leadership comrades observed that they "step on one another's feet." Worst of all, the intermediate organs total hundreds of thousands of people who do little or even cause harm, but receive much, too much. The weight of an apparatus that is too large and too inefficient is pressing on the true workers, people who

every day must rack their brains and sweat to produce wealth with which to nourish society. We have organized many seminars or forums on the radio or in newspapers, but none have entered deeply into the most vital, hottest problems at present, which are directly related to the existence of our revolution and nation. For example:

"Our most important strategic line is the collective mastership right of the people, so why have the people not yet truly become the masters?"

"What is the correct way of viewing and evaluating people in order to find people with real talent to effectively serve the new mechanism that is taking form?"

We are beginning 1986. A special event--the Sixth Party Congress--will take place at the end of this year. We place much hope in that historic congress. We know that a congress cannot eliminate all negative aspects, but the situation is ripe for meeting extremely pressing national demands: a complete change-over to the new mechanism, returning to the basic level the right to take the initiative in production and commerce, rearranging the apparatus in order to promote production, fully utilizing and assigning important responsibilities to, as soon as possible, to the people who truly contribute to making money and wealth for the nation, and resolutely eliminating the intermediate organs which are directly causing all sorts of difficulties for the production bases. It is above all necessary to bring about transformations in the organization of cadres at upper echelons because "only if the head is smooth can the tail slip through."

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CSO: 4209/549

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

SRV COMMUNIST PARTY MEETING REPORTED ENDING

OW071415 Tokyo KYODO in English 1254 GMT 7 Jun 86

[Text] Hanoi, 7 Jun KYODO--The Vietnamese Communist Party Friday finished a general meeting of the party Central Committee, which began in Hanoi 19 May, informed sources here said Saturday.

The sources pointed to the unusually long duration of the Central Committee meeting, 19 days compared with a usual schedule of 10 days or so for such a meeting.

The just-ended meeting, aimed at preparing for the next party congress scheduled for November, is believed to have reviewed the political situation over the 11 years since the end of the Vietnam war.

Watchers believe that there were heated debates centering on the failure of economic reforms since last summer and the resultant inflationary trends.

The watchers said the discussions also focused on the fourth five-year program for 1986-90, which is expected to be adopted at the November party congress, a long-term economic plan until 2000 as well as prevention of corruption and promotion of recruitment of younger party cadres.

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CSO: 4200/1115

AGRICULTURE

VIETNAM

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY REVIEWS WINTER-SPRING CROP OUTPUT

BK071139 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 5 Jun 86

[Text] On 5 June the Ministry of Agriculture held a conference to review the 1985-86 winter-spring crop production and discuss measures to triumphantly increase area, productivity, and output.

Since the beginning of the winter-spring season, various localities have strengthened supervision, improved rice cultivation patterns, fixed the areas for dry plowing, distributed fertilizer, and regulated the irrigation system. Thanks to these efforts, the country has planted 1,826,000 hectares of rice, exceeding the plan norm by 0.3 percent or 4.5 percent more than the previous winter-spring crop.

Northern localities have planted 235,000 hectares of winter-spring subsidiary food crops. The output of subsidiary food crops converted to paddy equivalent was 350,000 metric tons or 140,000 metric tons more than the previous winter-spring crop.

The country had planted 225,000 hectares of short-term industrial crops or 10 percent less than the previous crop. The summer-fall and the 10th-month rice crops play a very important role. The country has strived to plant 918,000 hectares of the summer-fall rice with an average yield of 33.3 quintals per hectare, and 3 million hectares of 10th-month rice with an average yield of 24.6 quintals per hectare in order to contribute to fulfilling this year's target of 20 million metric tons of grain.

Localities are striving to expand cultivation areas, promote intensive cultivation, and improve land and ricefields. They are taking measures to score total success in the summer-fall and 10th-month crops. Various sectors concerned and localities are striving to overcome difficulties to plant rice on all arable areas. The summer-fall and 10th-month crops account for 68 percent of the total cultivation areas and produce 68 percent of the total rice output annually. Localities must strive to cope with waterlogging and drought by draining canals and maintaining ready operation condition at water pumping stations. They must carefully and promptly prepare land, while sowing sufficient rice seedlings according to the pattern of 20 percent of short-term rice varieties such as CN-2 and CR-203 for the winter crop, and 70 percent of the CR-203, Moc Tuyen, and (Moc Hai Lun) varieties for the 10th-month crop. For

low-lying areas, they should use such rice varieties as U-10, U-14, and U-17 and so forth. For waterlogged areas, efforts should be made to plant rice in early July in order to accelerate rice to grow ears before the cold spell comes.

Provinces and cities must promptly prepare draft animals, fertilizer, and insecticide to serve intensive rice cultivation. Localities must formulate plans to mobilize tractors, draft animals, and manpower to prepare land carefully, fully use stable and green manure, and import more chemical fertilizer for distribution to ricefields. They must apply measures to eradicate harmful insects and strengthen various vegetation protection teams.

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CSO: 4209/580

HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

VIETNAM

BRIEFS

SOCIAL WELFARE FUND--Hanoi VNA 7 Jun--The Mekong River Delta province of Long An has initiated a "social welfare fund" aimed at helping families of disabled soldiers and fallen combatants. This fund, sponsored by the province's disabled soldiers and social affairs services, is raised from profits of local business and service establishments affiliated to [word indistinct] service including electronic repair and tailoring shops. Part of the fund also comes from contributions by the local association of collective peasants and other social organizations. This initiative has been put forward along the line of "joint efforts by the state and people" to improve the working people's welfare. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1542 GMT 7 Jun 86 OW] /7358

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